Single Idea 7955

[catalogued under 8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism]

Full Idea

Resemblance Nominalism cannot explain the fact that we know when and in what way new objects resemble old ones, and that we know when and in what ways new objects do not resemble old ones.

Gist of Idea

Resemblance Nominalism cannot explain either new resemblances, or absence of resemblances

Source

Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.6)

Book Reference

Macdonald,Cynthia: 'Varieties of Things' [Blackwell 2005], p.230


A Reaction

It is not clear what sort of theory would be needed to 'explain' such a thing. Unless there is an explanation of resemblance waiting in the wings (beyond asserting that resemblance is a universal), then this is not a strong objection.