Single Idea 8130

[catalogued under 15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality]

Full Idea

Harman defended what came to be known as 'representationalism' - the view that qualitative aspects of experience are nothing other than representational aspects.

Gist of Idea

Qualities of experience are just representational aspects of experience ('Representationalism')

Source

report of Gilbert Harman (The Intrinsic Quality of Experience [1990]) by Tyler Burge - Philosophy of Mind: 1950-2000 p.459

Book Reference

Burge,Tyler: 'Foundations of the Mind' [OUP 2007], p.459


A Reaction

Functionalists like Harman have a fairly intractable problem with the qualities of experience, and this may be clutching at straws. What does 'represent' mean? How is the representation achieved? Why that particular quale?