Single Idea 8258

[catalogued under 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment]

Full Idea

One of the chief rivals to my own substance-based ontology is the view that holds facts or states of affairs to be the building-blocks of the world.

Gist of Idea

Two of the main rivals for the foundations of ontology are substances, and facts or states-of-affairs

Source

E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], Pref)

Book Reference

Lowe,E.J.: 'The Possibility of Metaphysics' [OUP 2001], p.-4


A Reaction

I think I side with Lowe, even though I am uneasy about the gap between the philosopher's 'substance' and the basic entities of physics. Facts are hard to individuate, and seem to be composed of more basic elements.