Single Idea 8265

[catalogued under 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects]

Full Idea

Whether objects of a given kind should be thought actually to exist should, in general, be taken to turn on considerations of whether an inclusion of such objects in one's ontology has explanatory value.

Gist of Idea

Our commitment to the existence of objects should depend on their explanatory value

Source

E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 2.3)

Book Reference

Lowe,E.J.: 'The Possibility of Metaphysics' [OUP 2001], p.39


A Reaction

Blatantly fictional objects, such as fairies, might have wonderful explanatory value (they place dewdrops on flowers). Our ontological commitments cannot be decided one at a time, because consistency of the whole picture is the key value.