Single Idea 8312

[catalogued under 5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 3. Objectual Quantification]

Full Idea

If we take the existential quantifier to mean 'there is at least one thing that' then its value must qualify as one thing, individuable in principle. ...So I propose to read it as 'there is something that', which implies nothing about individuability.

Gist of Idea

It is better if the existential quantifier refers to 'something', rather than a 'thing' which needs individuation

Source

E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 11)

Book Reference

Lowe,E.J.: 'The Possibility of Metaphysics' [OUP 2001], p.228


A Reaction

All sorts of doubts about the existential quantifier seem to be creeping in nowadays (e.g. Ideas 6067, 6069, 8250). Personally I am drawn to the sound of 'free logic', Idea 8250, which drops existential claims. This would reduce metaphysical confusion.

Related Ideas

Idea 6067 Existential quantifiers just express the quantity of things, leaving existence to the predicate 'exists' [McGinn]

Idea 6069 'Partial quantifier' would be a better name than 'existential quantifier', as no existence would be implied [McGinn]

Idea 8250 So-called 'free logic' operates without existence assumptions [Meinong, by George/Van Evra]