Single Idea 9480

[catalogued under 26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 5. Laws from Universals]

Full Idea

The two criticisms levelled against Armstrong are that it is unclear what his relation of contingent necessitation is, and that it is unclear how it is able to necessitate anything.

Gist of Idea

Armstrong has an unclear notion of contingent necessitation, which can't necessitate anything


comment on David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983]) by Alexander Bird - Nature's Metaphysics 3.1.2

Book Reference

Bird,Alexander: 'Nature's Metaphysics' [OUP 2007], p.47

A Reaction

I suppose someone has to explore the middle ground between the mere contingencies of Humean regularities and the strong necessities of scientific essentialism. The area doesn't, however, look promising.