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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds

[there is no such thing as a 'possible world']

28 ideas
Possible worlds are a way to dramatise essentialism, and yet they presuppose essentialism [Quine]
Possible worlds don't fix necessities; intrinsic necessities imply the extension in worlds [Armstrong]
Possible worlds are useful in set theory, but can be very misleading elsewhere [Kripke]
Mathematical sentences are a problem in a possible-worlds framework [Jackson]
Possible worlds rely on what might have been, so they can' be used to define or analyse modality [Salmon,N]
We have no idea how many 'possible worlds' there might be [Jubien]
If all possible worlds just happened to include stars, their existence would be necessary [Jubien]
If there are no other possible worlds, do we then exist necessarily? [Jubien]
Possible worlds just give parallel contingencies, with no explanation at all of necessity [Jubien]
If other worlds exist, then they are scattered parts of the actual world [Jubien]
Worlds don't explain necessity; we use necessity to decide on possible worlds [Jubien]
The love of possible worlds is part of the dream that technical logic solves philosophical problems [Jubien]
Possible worlds don't explain necessity, because they are a bunch of parallel contingencies [Jubien]
Lewis must specify that all possibilities are in his worlds, making the whole thing circular [Shalkowski, by Sider]
If possible worlds are just fictions, they can't be truthmakers for modal judgements [Heil]
Does every abstract possible world exist in every possible world? [Lowe]
We could give up possible worlds if we based necessity on essences [Lowe]
One might hope to reduce possible worlds to properties [Swoyer]
Realism about possible worlds is circular, since it needs a criterion of 'possible' [Oderberg]
Possible worlds make every proposition true or false, which endorses classical logic [Hale]
If some book described a possibe life for you, that isn't what makes such a life possible [Jacobs]
Possible worlds semantics gives little insight into modality [Jacobs]
Possible worlds models contain sets of possible worlds; this is a large metaphysical commitment [Horsten/Pettigrew]
Using possible worlds for knowledge and morality may be a step too far [Horsten/Pettigrew]
Possibilities are like possible worlds, but not fully determinate or complete [Rumfitt]
If a world is a fully determinate way things could have been, can anyone consider such a thing? [Rumfitt]
Every philosophical theory must be true in some possible world, so the ontology is hopeless [Ingthorsson]
Worlds may differ in various respects, but no overall similarity of worlds is implied [Ingthorsson]