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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / d. Sources of pleasure

[what sorts of things can give us pleasure?]

9 ideas
We feel pleasure when we approach our natural state of harmony [Plato]
     Full Idea: When harmony is being restored, and the natural state of harmony is approached, then pleasure arises.
     From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 31d)
     A reaction: The supreme value of harmony was important to Plato, but most of us are less convinced, I suspect. The way to achieve harmony is to avoid anything stressful.
There are three types of pleasure, for reason, for spirit and for appetite [Plato]
     Full Idea: Each of the three mental categories (reason, spirit, appetite) has its own particular pleasure, so that there are three kinds of pleasure.
     From: Plato (The Republic [c.374 BCE], 580d)
     A reaction: I'm not sure why the types of pleasure are distinguished by mental faculties, rather than by the variety of sources of the pleasure.
Some things are not naturally pleasant, but become so through disease or depravity [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Some things are not naturally pleasant but become so, either through injury, or through habit, or through congenital depravity.
     From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1148b16)
     A reaction: We might say that there are indeed 'unnatural pleasures' (e.g. sadism?), but still have to admit that we have no clear way of distinguishing the natural from the unnatural. What about gambling? Or watching horror films?
While replenishing we even enjoy unpleasant things, but only absolute pleasures when we are replenished [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: People do not enjoy the same things while their natural state is being replenished as they do when it is complete; in the restored state they enjoy things that are absolutely pleasant, but while it is being replenished they enjoy even unpleasant things.
     From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1152a03)
     A reaction: This is a nice distinction, which ties in with the dictum "never go to the supermarket when you are hungry". It is also a nice illustration of Aristotle's vital moral view that there is a 'natural state' for a human being.
The great pleasures come from the contemplation of noble works [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: The great pleasures come from the contemplation of noble works.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B194), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.03.46
     A reaction: Only, of course, for those able to perceive the nobility. In what does the 'nobility' consist, other than in the morally acceptable pleasure? Hard to explain 'noble'. Just 'wow!'?
Moderation brings more pleasures, and so increases pleasure [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: Moderation multiplies pleasures, and increases pleasure.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B211), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.05.27
     A reaction: So moderation is a sneaky trick to avoid moderation? I presume the most intense pleasures are mostly unfamiliar, and so add novelty to the mix. Apart from eating chocolate, of course.
People more obviously enjoy social pleasures than they do eating and drinking [Shaftesbury]
     Full Idea: How much the social pleasures are superior to any other may be known by visible tokens and effects; the marks and signs which attend this sort of joy are more intense and clear than those which attend the satisfaction of thirst and hunger.
     From: 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury (Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit [1699], II.II.I)
     A reaction: He presumably refers to smiles and laughter, but they could be misleading as they are partly a means of social communication. You should ask people whether they would prefer a nice conversation or a good pork chop. Nice point, though.
Epicureans achieve pleasure through character development [Annas]
     Full Idea: Since having a virtue does not reduce to performing certain kinds of acts, the Epicurean will achieve pleasure only by aiming at being a certain kind of person.
     From: Julia Annas (The Morality of Happiness [1993], 2.4)
     A reaction: No Epicurean would want to merely possess virtues, without enacting them. I assume that virtues are sought as guides to finding the finest pleasures (such as friendship).
The 'locus coeruleus' is one of several candidates for the brain's 'pleasure centre' [Carter,R]
     Full Idea: Noradrenaline is an excitatory chemical that induces physical and mental arousal and heightens mood. Production is centred in an area of the brain called the locus coeruleus, which is one of several candidates for the brain's 'pleasure' centre.
     From: Rita Carter (Mapping the Mind [1998], p. 30)
     A reaction: It seems to me very morally desirable that people understand facts of this kind, so that they can be more objective about pleasure. Pleasure is one cog in the machine that makes a person, not the essence of human life.