structure for 'Mind and Body'    |     alphabetical list of themes    |     expand these ideas

17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism

[we are incapable of explaining the mind-body link]

13 ideas
There are no secure foundations to prove the separate existence of mind, in reason or experience [William of Ockham]
Thinking without matter and matter that thinks are equally baffling [Locke]
We can't begin to conceive what would produce some particular experience within our minds [Locke]
Thoughts moving bodies, and bodies producing thoughts, are equally unknowable [Locke]
Why are we not aware of the huge gap between mind and brain in ordinary life? [Wittgenstein]
Consciousness seems indefinable by conditions or categories [Searle]
Nagel's title creates an impenetrable mystery, by ignoring a bat's ways that may not be "like" anything [Dennett on Nagel]
We can't be objective about experience [Nagel]
Examining mind sees no brain; examining brain sees no mind [McGinn]
McGinn invites surrender, by saying it is hopeless trying to imagine conscious machines [Dennett on McGinn]
Phenomenal consciousness is fundamental, with no possible nonphenomenal explanation [Chalmers, by Kriegel/Williford]
Nothing external shows whether a mouse is conscious [Chalmers]
The 'explanatory gap' is used to say consciousness is inexplicable, at least with current concepts [Heil]