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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 3. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation

[causes explained in terms of alternative events]

31 ideas
Cause is where if the first object had not been, the second had not existed [Hume]
Causal counterfactuals are just clumsy linguistic attempts to indicate dispositions [Martin,CB]
The full counterfactual story asserts a series of events, because counterfactuals are not transitive [Bennett]
A counterfactual about an event implies something about the event's essence [Bennett]
Many counterfactuals have nothing to do with causation [Kim]
Causation is not the only dependency relation expressed by counterfactuals [Kim]
Counterfactuals can express four other relations between events, apart from causation [Kim]
Causal dependence is counterfactual dependence between events [Lewis]
The counterfactual view says causes are necessary (rather than sufficient) for their effects [Bird on Lewis]
Lewis has basic causation, counterfactuals, and a general ancestral (thus handling pre-emption) [Bird on Lewis]
Counterfactual causation implies all laws are causal, which they aren't [Tooley on Lewis]
My counterfactual analysis applies to particular cases, not generalisations [Lewis]
One event causes another iff there is a causal chain from first to second [Lewis]
Causation is when at the closest world without the cause, there is no effect either [Lewis]
Counterfactuals 'backtrack' if a different present implies a different past [Lewis]
Causal counterfactuals must avoid backtracking, to avoid epiphenomena and preemption [Lewis]
Analyse counterfactuals using causation, not the other way around [Horwich]
Causal dependence explains counterfactual dependence, not vice versa [Molnar]
Counterfactual causation makes causes necessary but not sufficient [Lipton]
Causation is nothing more than the counterfactuals it grounds? [Hawley]
We can give up the counterfactual account if we take causal language at face value [Mumford]
Counterfactual claims about causation imply that it is more than just regular succession [Psillos]
We don't pick a similar world from many - we construct one possibility from the description [Maudlin]
Evaluating counterfactuals involves context and interests [Maudlin]
If we know the cause of an event, we seem to assent to the counterfactual [Maudlin]
The counterfactual is ruined if some other cause steps in when the antecedent fails [Maudlin]
If the effect hadn't occurred the cause wouldn't have happened, so counterfactuals are two-way [Maudlin]
The counterfactual approach makes no distinction between cause and pre-condition [Bird]
Occasionally a cause makes no difference (pre-emption, perhaps) so the counterfactual is false [Mumford/Anjum]
Is a cause because of counterfactual dependence, or is the dependence because there is a cause? [Mumford/Anjum]
Cases of preventing a prevention may give counterfactual dependence without causation [Mumford/Anjum]