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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties

[rejection of the category of properties]

18 ideas
Accidents are not parts of bodies (like blood in a cloth); they have accidents as things have a size [Hobbes]
We realise that properties are sensations of the feeling subject, not part of the thing [Nietzsche]
Russell can't attribute existence to properties [McGinn on Russell]
Because things can share attributes, we cannot individuate attributes clearly [Quine]
Predicates are not names; predicates are the other parties to predication [Quine]
There is no proper identity concept for properties, and it is hard to distinguish one from two [Quine]
Quine suggests that properties can be replaced with extensional entities like sets [Quine, by Shapiro]
Quine says that if second-order logic is to quantify over properties, that can be done in first-order predicate logic [Quine, by Benardete,JA]
Quine brought classes into semantics to get rid of properties [Quine, by McGinn]
Don't analyse 'red is a colour' as involving properties. Say 'all red things are coloured things' [Quine, by Orenstein]
Very nominalistic philosophers deny properties, though scientists accept them [Putnam]
Redness is not a property as it is not mind-independent [Ellis]
Field presumes properties can be eliminated from science [Field,H, by Szabó]
If possible worlds are needed to define properties, maybe we should abandon properties [Scruton]
Nominalists ask why we should postulate properties at all [Mellor/Oliver]
Fundamental physics seems to suggest there are no such things as properties [Maudlin]
Does the knowledge of each property require an infinity of accompanying knowledge? [Macdonald,C]
We can reduce properties to true formulas [Halbach/Leigh]