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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties

[properties which constitute the natural world]

30 ideas
For Aristotle, there are only as many properties as actually exist [Aristotle, by Jacquette]
Physical properties are those relevant to how a physical system might act [Ellis]
There is no property of 'fragility', as things are each fragile in a distinctive way [Ellis]
Properties imply natural classes which can be picked out by everybody [Quinton]
The naturalness of a class depends as much on the observers as on the objects [Quinton]
Genuine properties are closely related to genuine changes [Shoemaker]
Properties must be essentially causal if we can know and speak about them [Shoemaker]
To ascertain genuine properties, examine the object directly [Shoemaker]
Humeans see predicates as independent, but science says they are connected [Harré/Madden]
Natural properties give similarity, joint carving, intrinsicness, specificity, homogeneity... [Lewis]
Defining natural properties by means of laws of nature is potentially circular [Lewis]
We can't define natural properties by resemblance, if they are used to explain resemblance [Lewis]
I don't take 'natural' properties to be fixed by the nature of one possible world [Lewis]
We might try defining the natural properties by a short list of them [Lewis]
Sparse properties rest either on universals, or on tropes, or on primitive naturalness [Lewis, by Maudlin]
I assume there could be natural properties that are not instantiated in our world [Lewis]
Natural properties figure in the analysis of similarity in intrinsic respects [Lewis, by Oliver]
Lewisian natural properties fix reference of predicates, through a principle of charity [Lewis, by Hawley]
Objects are demarcated by density and chemistry, and natural properties belong in what is well demarcated [Lewis]
Reference partly concerns thought and language, partly eligibility of referent by natural properties [Lewis]
Natural properties tend to belong to well-demarcated things, typically loci of causal chains [Lewis]
For us, a property being natural is just an aspect of its featuring in the contents of our attitudes [Lewis]
All perfectly natural properties are intrinsic [Lewis, by Lewis]
Natural properties fix resemblance and powers, and are picked out by universals [Lewis]
'Being physical' is a second-order property [Molnar]
Functionalists in Fodor's camp usually say that a genuine property is one that figures in some causal laws [Heil]
There are only first-order properties ('red'), and none of higher-order ('coloured') [Swoyer]
Scientific properties are defined by the laws that embody them [Psillos, by Ladyman/Ross]
A property is fundamental if two objects can differ in only that respect [Maudlin]
Causal essentialism says properties are nothing but causal relations [Ladyman/Ross]