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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique

[criticisms of the coherentist view]

22 ideas
If undetailed, 'coherence' is just a vague words that covers all possible arguments [Ewing]
Coherent justification seems to require retrieving all our beliefs simultaneously [Goldman]
Fully comprehensive beliefs may not be knowledge [Sosa]
If we have to appeal explicitly to epistemic norms, that will produce an infinite regress [Pollock]
My incoherent beliefs about art should not undermine my very coherent beliefs about physics [Bonjour]
Coherence seems to justify empirical beliefs about externals when there is no external input [Bonjour]
Coherentists must give a reason why coherent justification is likely to lead to the truth [Bonjour]
Why should diverse parts of our knowledge be connected? [Williams,M]
Coherence theory must give a foundational status to coherence itself [Williams,M]
Maths may be consistent with observations, but not coherent [Audi,R]
It is very hard to show how much coherence is needed for justification [Audi,R]
A consistent madman could have a very coherent belief system [Audi,R]
Coherence theories fail, because they can't accommodate perception as the basis of knowledge [Pollock/Cruz]
Coherence theories isolate justification from the world [Pollock/Cruz]
Individualistic coherentism lacks access to all of my beliefs, or critical judgement of my assessment [Kusch]
Individual coherentism cannot generate the necessary normativity [Kusch]
My justifications might be very coherent, but totally unconnected to the world [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
Mere agreement of testimonies is not enough to make truth very likely [Olsson]
Coherence is only needed if the informations sources are not fully reliable [Olsson]
A purely coherent theory cannot be true of the world without some contact with the world [Olsson]
Extending a system makes it less probable, so extending coherence can't make it more probable [Olsson]
Coherence theories struggle with the role of experience [Mittag]