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5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox

[problem when liars refer to themselves]

16 ideas
If you say truly that you are lying, you are lying [Dancy,R on Eubulides]
One of their own prophets said that Cretans are always liars [Anon (Titus)]
'This sentence is false' sends us in a looping search for its proposition [Fogelin on Wittgenstein]
The Liar makes us assert a false sentence, so it must be taken seriously [Tarski]
The Liar reappears, even if one insists on propositions instead of sentences [Gupta]
Strengthened Liar: either this sentence is neither-true-nor-false, or it is not true [Gupta]
The machinery used to solve the Liar can be rejigged to produce a new Liar [Hart,WD]
An infinite series of sentences asserting falsehood produces the paradox without self-reference [Sorensen on Yablo]
The Liar seems like a truth-value 'gap', but dialethists see it as a 'glut' [Burgess]
There are Liar Pairs, and Liar Chains, which fit the same pattern as the basic Liar [Priest,G]
If you know that a sentence is not one of the known sentences, you know its truth [Priest,G]
Self-reference paradoxes seem to arise only when falsity is involved [Read]
Banning self-reference would outlaw 'This very sentence is in English' [Sorensen]
Tarski avoids the Liar Paradox, because truth cannot be asserted within the object language [Fisher]
Strengthened Liar: 'this sentence is not true in any context' - in no context can this be evaluated [Horsten]
The liar paradox applies truth to a negated truth (but the conditional will serve equally) [Halbach]