| 21360 | Unobservant thinkers tend to dogmatise using insufficient facts [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Those whom devotion to abstract discussions has rendered unobservant of the facts are too ready to dogmatise on the basis of a few observations. | |
| From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 316a09) | |
| A reaction: I totally approve of the idea that a good philosopher should be 'observant'. Prestige in modern analytic philosophy comes from logical ability. There should be some rival criterion for attentiveness to facts, with equal prestige. |
| 2845 | Free and great-souled men do not keep asking "what is the use of it?" [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: To be constantly asking 'what is the use of it?' is unbecoming to those of great soul, and unworthy of free men. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1338b01) | |
| A reaction: Love this one! It is not just philosophers who keep hearing this question. Pure mathematics, history, literature, even carpentry if you are not going to be a carpenter. |
| 1767 | Everyone should study philosophy until they see all people in the same light [Crates of Thebes, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: A man should study philosophy up to the point of looking on generals and donkey-drivers in the same light. | |
| From: report of Crates (Theb) (fragments/reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 06.Cr.9 | |
| A reaction: This seems to reject Aristote's idea that some people are clearly superior to others. |
| 22758 | Philosophy aims at a happy life, through argument and discussion [Epicurus] |
| Full Idea: Philosophy is an activity which secures the happy life by arguments and discussions. | |
| From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Ethicists (one book) VI.169 | |
| A reaction: Presumably this aims at the happiness of the participant. Universal happiness would need to be much more political. If this is your aim then you can't just follow the winds of the argument, but must channel it towards happiness. No nasty truths? |
| 20867 | True philosophising is not memorising ideas, but living by them [Stoic school, by Stobaeus] |
| Full Idea: It is not the man who listens eagerly and memorises what philosophers say who is prepared for philosophising, but the man who is prepared to carry into action what is pronounced in philosophy and to live by it. | |
| From: report of Stoic school (fragments/reports [c.200 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 2.11k | |
| A reaction: Hence stoicism was seen more as a way of life, and less as theorising. I aim to combine the two. There is a way of life which centres on theorising about life while living it. A life without enquiry is not worth living. |
| 13293 | What philosophy offers humanity is guidance [Seneca] |
| Full Idea: Shall I tell you what philosophy holds out for humanity? Counsel. | |
| From: Seneca the Younger (Letters from a Stoic [c.60], 048) | |
| A reaction: See Quine for a flat modern denial of this claim (Idea 9764). There is a modern tendency to see ethics and political thought operating at a meta- or metameta- level. I take the main ethical theories to be very illuminating of real life. |
| 13317 | Philosophy aims at happiness [Seneca] |
| Full Idea: Philosophy takes as her aim the state of happiness. | |
| From: Seneca the Younger (Letters from a Stoic [c.60], 090) | |
| A reaction: A startlingly forthright view. It seems to neglect what I take to be the main aim of philosophy, which is to achieve understanding. I presume true happiness would follow from that. Seneca must now explain why soporific pleasure is wrong. |
| 20876 | Philosophy investigates the causes of disagreements, and seeks a standard for settling them [Epictetus] |
| Full Idea: The start of philosophy is perception of the mutual conflict among people, and a search for its cause, plus the rejection and distrust of mere opinion, an investigation to see if opinion is right, and the discovery of some canon, like scales for weighing. | |
| From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 2.11.13) | |
| A reaction: So the number one aim of philosophy is epistemological, to find the criterion for true opinion. But it starts in real life, and would cease to trade if people would just agree. I think we should set the bar higher than that. |
| 23269 | Philosophy must start from clearly observed facts [Galen] |
| Full Idea: True philosophers concern themselves first and foremost to take clearly observed facts as their point of departure. | |
| From: Galen (The soul's dependence on the body [c.170], Kiv.11.817) | |
| A reaction: I love this one, especially the desire that the facts be 'clearly observed'. That, thank goodness, eliminates quantum mechanics. If you don't love history and the physical sciences, you are not a philosopher. Oh, and reliable gossip. |
| 22101 | Philosophy aims to know the truth about the way things are [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: The study of philosophy has as its purpose to know not what people have thought, but rather the truth about the way things are. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Sententia on 'De Caelo' [1268], I.22.228), quoted by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 05 | |
| A reaction: I agree with this deeply unfashionable opinion. Of course, modern investigations must be more sensitive to biases built into language, culture and conceptual schemes. But I am one of those sad old folks who still think truths can be stated. |
| 22026 | Philosophy is homesickness - the urge to be at home everywhere [Novalis] |
| Full Idea: Philosophy is actually homesickness - the urge to be everywhere at home. | |
| From: Novalis (General Draft [1799], 45) | |
| A reaction: The idea of home [heimat] is powerful in German culture. The point of romanticism was seen as largely concerning restless souls like Byron and his heroes, who do not feel at home. Hence ironic detachment. |
| 21970 | Philosophy attains its goal if one person feels perfect accord between their system and experience [Fichte] |
| Full Idea: If even a single person is completely convinced of his philosophy; ...if his free judgement in philosophising, and what life obtrudes upon him, are perfectly in accord; then in this person philosophy has completed its circuit and attained its goal. | |
| From: Johann Fichte (works [1798], I:512), quoted by A.W. Moore - The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics 06.4 | |
| A reaction: Interesting to hear a famous idealist offering accordance with real life as a criterion for philosophical success. But that is real life, but not as you and I may know it.... His criterion is very subjective. A bad philosopher might attain it? |
| 19442 | I don't study Plato for his own sake; the primary aim is always understanding [Feuerbach] |
| Full Idea: Plato in writing is only a means for me; that which is primary and a priori, that which is the ground to which all is ultimately referred, is understanding. | |
| From: Ludwig Feuerbach (Towards a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy [1839], p.63) | |
| A reaction: It always seems to that the main aim of philosophy is understanding - which is why its central activity is explanation. |
| 5300 | Philosophers have interpreted the world, but the point is to change it [Marx] |
| Full Idea: The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it. | |
| From: Karl Marx (Theses on Feuerbach [1846], §XI) | |
| A reaction: The 'point' of what? Personally I am more with Aristotle - that the aim is to create a society in which we can all aspire to contemplate like gods. As an interim statement of aim, though, one must respect Marx. But was he a philosopher? |
| 23027 | Ideals and metaphysics are practical, not imaginative or speculative [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
| Full Idea: To T.H. Green an ideal was no creation of an idle imagination, metaphysics no mere play of the speculative reason. Ideals were the most solid, and metaphysics the most practical thing about a man. | |
| From: report of T.H. Green (works [1875]) by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State I | |
| A reaction: This is despite the fact that Green was an idealist in the Hegelian tradition. I like this. I see it not just as ideals having practical guiding influence, but also that ideals themselves arising out of experience. |
| 19228 | Sciences concern existence, but philosophy also concerns potential existence [Peirce] |
| Full Idea: Philosophy differs from the special sciences in not confining itself to the reality of existence, but also to the reality of potential being. | |
| From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], I) | |
| A reaction: One might reply that sciences also concern potential being, if their output is universal generalisations (such as 'laws'). I take disposition and powers to be central to existence, which are hence of interest to sciences. |
| 24142 | What matters is how humans can be developed [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: What can be made out of humans: this is what matters to superior human beings. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[435]) | |
| A reaction: That seems to sum up the main aim of Nietzsche's philosophy. What would we then do if the aim was somehow achieved? Does he seriously think that one magnificent ubermensch could achieve this aim? |
| 2930 | The main aim of philosophy must be to determine the order of rank among values [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: The future task of the philosophers is the solution of the problem of value, the determination of the order of rank among values. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], I.§17 note) | |
| A reaction: 'Determine' is presumably either a power struggle, or needs criteria by which to do the judging. |
| 14885 | The first aim of a philosopher is a life, not some works [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: The philosopher's product is his life (first, before his works). It is his work of art. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1872-74 [1873], 29 [205]) |
| 14887 | You should only develop a philosophy if you are willing to live by it [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: One should have a philosophy only to the extent that one is capable of living according to this philosophy: so that everything does not become mere words. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1872-74 [1873], 30 [17]) |
| 23025 | Philosophers should be more inductive, and test results by their conclusions, not their self-evidence [Russell] |
| Full Idea: The progress of philosophy seems to demand that, like science, it should learn to practise induction, to test its premisses by the conclusions to which they lead, and not merely by their apparent self-evidence. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Explanations in reply to Mr Bradley [1899], nr end) | |
| A reaction: [from Twitter] Love this. It is 'one person's modus ponens is another person's modus tollens'. I think all philosophical conclusions, without exception, should be reached by evaluating the final result fully, and not just following a line of argument. |
| 18005 | Philosophy aims to become more disciplined about categories [Ryle] |
| Full Idea: Philosophy is the replacement of category-habits by category-disciplines. | |
| From: Gilbert Ryle (The Concept of Mind [1949], Intro p.8), quoted by Ofra Magidor - Category Mistakes 1.2 | |
| A reaction: I rather like this. It fits the view the idea that metaphysics aims to give the structure of reality. If there are not reasonably uniform categories for things, then reality is indescribable. Improving our categories seems a thoroughly laudable aim. |
| 21845 | Philosophy aims to become the official language, supporting orthodoxy and the state [Deleuze] |
| Full Idea: Philosophy is shot through with the project of becoming the official language of a Pure State. The exercise of thought thus conforms to the goals of the real State, to the dominant meanings and to the requirements of the established order. | |
| From: Gilles Deleuze (A Conversation: what is it? What is it for? [1977], I) | |
| A reaction: [He cites Nietzsche's 'Schopenhauer as Educator' as the source of this] Is Karl Marx included in this generalisation, or Diogenes of Sinope? Is conservative philosophy thereby invalidated? |
| 2352 | The job of the philosopher is to distinguish facts about the world from conventions [Putnam] |
| Full Idea: It is the job of the philosopher to distinguish what is fact and what is convention in our theorising about the world. | |
| From: Hilary Putnam (Representation and Reality [1988], §7 p.112) | |
| A reaction: This may well be the entire truth about philosophy. It begins with the Nomos-Physis debate in ancient Athens, and it turns out to be the key issue in almost every area of metaphysics, epistemology, aesthetics and morality. |
| 20962 | Habermas seems to make philosophy more democratic [Habermas, by Bowie] |
| Full Idea: Habermas is concerned to avoid the traumas of modern German history by making democracy an integral part of philosophy. | |
| From: report of Jürgen Habermas (The Theory of Communicative Action [1981]) by Andrew Bowie - Introduction to German Philosophy Conc 'Habermas' | |
| A reaction: Hence Habermas's emphasis on communication as central to language, which is central to philosophy. Modern philosophy departments are amazingly hierarchical. |
| 19066 | Philosophy aims to understand the world, through ordinary experience and science [Dummett] |
| Full Idea: Philosophy is an attempt to understand the world, as it is revealed to us both in our ordinary experience and by the discoveries and theories of science. | |
| From: Michael Dummett (The Justification of Deduction [1973], p.311) | |
| A reaction: I don't see a sharp division between 'ordinary' and 'scientific'. I really like this idea, first because it makes 'understanding' central, and second because it wants both revelations. In discussing matter and time, there is too much emphasis on science. |
| 16281 | Honesty requires philosophical theories we can commit to with our ordinary commonsense [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: The maxim of honesty: never put forward a philosophical theory that you yourself cannot believe in your least philosophical and most commonsensical moments. | |
| From: David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], 2.8) | |
| A reaction: I take it as important that this test is according to the philosopher's commonsense, and not according to some populist idea. This would allow, for example, for commonsense to be sensitive to scientific knowledge, or awareness of the logic. |
| 3798 | An overexamined life is as bad as an unexamined one [Dennett] |
| Full Idea: The unexamined life may not be worth living, but the overexamined life is nothing to write home about either. | |
| From: Daniel C. Dennett (Elbow Room: varieties of free will [1984], §4.2) | |
| A reaction: Presumably he means a life which is all theory and no practice. Compare Idea 343. |
| 8242 | Philosophy aims at what is interesting, remarkable or important - not at knowledge or truth [Deleuze/Guattari] |
| Full Idea: Philosophy does not consist in knowing, and is not inspired by truth. Rather, it is categories like Interesting, Remarkable, or Important that determine success or failure. | |
| From: G Deleuze / F Guattari (What is Philosophy? [1991], 1.3) | |
| A reaction: Speak for yourself. I wonder what the criteria are for 'Interesting' or 'Important'. They can't seriously count 'remarkable' as a criterion of philosophical success, can they? There can be remarkable stupidity. |
| 9327 | Organisms understand their worlds better if they understand themselves [Gulick] |
| Full Idea: Organisms come to better understand their worlds by coming to better understand themselves and the ways in which their own structures engage their worlds. | |
| From: Robert van Gulick (Mirror Mirror - Is That All? [2006], §III) | |
| A reaction: Van Gulick is defending a higher-order theory of consciousness, but this strikes me as a good rationale for the target of philosophy, which has increasingly (since Descartes) focused on understanding our own minds. |
| 18559 | Philosophy is empty if it does not in some way depend on matters of fact [Machery] |
| Full Idea: Save, maybe, for purely formal (e.g. logical) theories, philosophical claims whose correctness does not depend, however indirectly, on matters of fact are empty: they are neither true nor false. | |
| From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], Intro) | |
| A reaction: I subscribe to this view. I'd even say that logic is empty if it is not answerable to the facts. The facts are nature, so this is a naturalistic manifesto. |
| 23531 | Philosophers should interpret the world, by expressing its possibilities [Berardi] |
| Full Idea: The philosopher's task is to interpret the world, that is, to capture its tendency and above all to enunciate the possibilities inscribed therein. …The politician's eye does not see the possible, being attracted instead by the probable. | |
| From: Franco 'Bifo' Berardi (The Second Coming [2019], How to) | |
| A reaction: An inspiring idea! He is rejecting Marx's aim of changing the world, which had 'catastrophic' results. But I love his view of interpretation as spotting tendencies and possibilities. This fits my preferred ontology of dispositions and powers. |