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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / c. Parts of consciousness

[different parts of a conscious mind]

7 ideas
Our large perceptions and appetites are made up tiny unconscious fragments [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Our great perceptions and our great appetites of which we are conscious, are composed of innumerable little perceptions and little inclinations of which we cannot be conscious.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Remond de Montmort [1715], 1715 §2)
     A reaction: I think this is a wonderfully accurate report of how the mind is, in comparison with the much more simplistic views presented by most philosophers of that era. And so much understanding flows from Leibniz's account.
Consciousness is both of objects, and of itself [Hegel]
     Full Idea: Consciousness is, on the one hand, consciousness of the object, and on the other, consciousness of itself.
     From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Phenomenology of Spirit [1807], p.052), quoted by Stephen Houlgate - An Introduction to Hegel 03 'The Method'
     A reaction: Hume challenges whether there is any knowledge of consciousness purely in itself. Schopenhauer flatly disagreed (Idea 4166) - but then he would, wouldn't he?
Maybe language is crucial to consciousness [Dennett]
     Full Idea: I continue to argue for a crucial role of natural language in generating the central features of consciousness.
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Brainchildren [1998], Ch.25)
     A reaction: 'Central features' might beg the question. Dennett does doubt the consciousness of animals (1996). As I stare out of my window, his proposal seems deeply counterintuitive. How could language 'generate' consciousness? Would loss of language create zombies?
Maybe we should see intentionality and consciousness as a single problem, not two [Kirk,R]
     Full Idea: Many philosophers today have adopted the view that we can achieve an enormous simplification by reducing the two components of the mind-body problem - intentionality and consciousness - into one; ...consciousness is no more than representations.
     From: Robert Kirk (Mind and Body [2003], §8.4)
     A reaction: One would then see subjective experience and informational content as two consequences of a single mental activity. This strikes me as the correct route to go. We do, after all, learn BY experiencing. Hence concepts are tied in with qualia.
Consciousness involves awareness, perception, self-awareness, attention and reflection [Carter,R]
     Full Idea: Awareness, perception, self-awareness, attention and reflection are all separate components of consciousness, and the quality of our experience varies according to which and how many of them are present.
     From: Rita Carter (Mapping the Mind [1998], p.300)
     A reaction: Philosophers like to emphasise 'qualia' and 'intentionality'. This remark slices the cake differently. 'Attention' is interesting, dividing consciousness into two areas, with some experience fading away into the darkness. Hume denied self-awareness.
'Phenomenal' consciousness is of qualities; 'apperceptive' consciousness includes beliefs and desires [Lowe]
     Full Idea: There is 'phenomenal' consciousness, which is what is distinctive of qualitative states of experience, and 'apperceptive' consciousness, which is awareness of all of one's mental states, including beliefs and desires.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 3)
     A reaction: I am not convinced that this distinction is sharp enough to be useful, though I approve of trying to analyse the components of consciousness. Is there 'intentional' consciousness? Desires, and even beliefs, can have qualities.
The three essentials of conscious experience are privateness, unity and informativeness [Edelman/Tononi]
     Full Idea: The fundamental aspects of conscious experience that are common to all its phenomenological manifestations are: privateness, unity, and informativeness.
     From: G Edelman / G Tononi (Consciousness: matter becomes imagination [2000], Ch. 3)
     A reaction: Interesting, coming from neuroscientists. The list strikes me as rather passive. It is no use having good radar if you can't make decisions. Privacy and unity are overrated. Who gets 'informed'? Personal identity must be basic.