structure for 'Existence'    |     alphabetical list of themes    |     expand these ideas

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment

[nature of existence commitments]

21 ideas
Whenever there's speech it has to be about something [Plato]
For Frege, ontological questions are to be settled by reference to syntactic structures [Frege, by Wright,C]
'Existence' means that a propositional function is sometimes true [Russell]
A linguistic framework involves commitment to entities, so only commitment to the framework is in question [Carnap]
Names have no ontological commitment, because we can deny that they name anything [Quine]
General terms don't commit us ontologically, but singular terms with substitution do [Quine]
What actually exists does not, of course, depend on language [Quine]
A logically perfect language could express all truths, so all truths must be logically expressible [Quine, by Hossack]
Our commitments are to an 'ontology', but also to an 'ideology', or conceptual system [Hintikka]
The context principle for names rules out a special philosophical sense for 'existence' [Dummett]
The objects we recognise the world as containing depends on the structure of our language [Dummett]
You can reduce ontological commitment by expanding the logic [Field,H]
The identity of Pegasus with Pegasus may be true, despite the non-existence [Hale/Wright]
Ontology must include the minimum requirements for our semantics [Jacquette]
Two of the main rivals for the foundations of ontology are substances, and facts or states-of-affairs [Lowe]
Some abstractions exist despite lacking causal powers, because explanation needs them [Lowe]
Modern metaphysics often derives ontology from the logical forms of sentences [Azzouni]
We speak of a theory's 'ideological commitments' as well as its 'ontological commitments' [Linnebo]
We are committed to a 'group' of children, if they are sitting in a circle [Hossack]
Rival ontological claims can both be true, if there are analytic relationships between them [Thomasson]
We can distinguish 'ontological' from 'existential' commitment, for different kinds of being [Anderson,CA]