14971 | D is valid on every serial frame, but not where there are dead ends [Cresswell] |
Full Idea: If a frame contains any dead end or blind world, then D is not valid on that frame, ...but D is valid on every serial frame. | |
From: Max J. Cresswell (Modal Logic [2001], 7.1.1) |
13114 | □P → P is not valid in D (Deontic Logic), since an obligatory action may be not performed [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: System D is usually thought of as Deontic Logic, concerning obligations and permissions. □P → P is not valid in D, since just because an action is obligatory, it does not follow that it is performed. | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.12.2 Ex) |
9743 | The system D has the 'serial' conditon imposed on its accessibility relation [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: The system D has the 'serial' condition imposed on its accessibility relation - that is, every world must have some world which is accessible to it. | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.8) |
13706 | Intuitively, deontic accessibility seems not to be reflexive, but to be serial [Sider] |
Full Idea: Deontic accessibility seems not to be reflexive (that it ought to be true doesn't make it true). One could argue that it is serial (that there is always a world where something is acceptable). | |
From: Theodore Sider (Logic for Philosophy [2010], 6.3.1) |
13710 | In D we add that 'what is necessary is possible'; then tautologies are possible, and contradictions not necessary [Sider] |
Full Idea: In D we add to K a new axiom saying that 'what's necessary is possible' (□φ→◊φ), ..and it can then be proved that tautologies are possible and contradictions are not necessary. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Logic for Philosophy [2010], 6.4.2) |
19033 | Deontic modalities are 'ought-to-be', for sentences, and 'ought-to-do' for predicates [Vetter] |
Full Idea: Deontic modality can be divided into sentence-modifying 'ought-to-be' modals, and predicate-modifying 'ought-to-do' modals. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 6.9.2) | |
A reaction: [She cites Brennan 1993] These two seem to correspond to what is 'good' (ought to be), and what is 'right' (ought to do). Since I like that distinction, I also like this one. |