8942 | Lukasiewicz's L3 logic has three truth-values, T, F and I (for 'indeterminate') [Lukasiewicz, by Fisher] |
Full Idea: In response to Aristotle's sea-battle problem, Lukasiewicz proposed a three-valued logic that has come to be known as L3. In addition to the values true and false (T and F), there is a third truth-value, I, meaning 'indeterminate' or 'possible'. | |
From: report of Jan Lukasiewicz (Elements of Mathematical Logic [1928], 7.I) by Jennifer Fisher - On the Philosophy of Logic | |
A reaction: [He originated the idea in 1917] In what sense is the third value a 'truth' value? Is 'I don't care' a truth-value? Or 'none of the above'? His idea means that formalization doesn't collapse when things get obscure. You park a few propositions under I. |
14263 | Strong Kleene disjunction just needs one true disjunct; Weak needs the other to have some value [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Under strong Kleene tables, a disjunction will be true if one of the disjuncts is true, regardless of whether or not the other disjunct has a truth-value; under the weak table it is required that the other disjunct also have a value. So for other cases. | |
From: Kit Fine (Some Puzzles of Ground [2010], n7) | |
A reaction: [see also p.111 of Fine's article] The Kleene tables seem to be the established form of modern three-valued logic, with the third value being indeterminate. |
21602 | Many-valued logics don't solve vagueness; its presence at the meta-level is ignored [Williamson] |
Full Idea: It is an illusion that many-valued logic constitutes a well-motivated and rigorously worked out theory of vagueness. ...[top] There has been a reluctance to acknowledge higher-order vagueness, or to abandon classical logic in the meta-language. | |
From: Timothy Williamson (Vagueness [1994], 4.12) |
18787 | Three-valued logic is useful for a theory of presupposition [Mares] |
Full Idea: One reason for wanting a three-valued logic is to act as a basis of a theory of presupposition. | |
From: Edwin D. Mares (Negation [2014], 3.1) | |
A reaction: [He cites Strawson 1950] The point is that you can get a result when the presupposition does not apply, as in talk of the 'present King of France'. |
8943 | Three-valued logic says excluded middle and non-contradition are not tautologies [Fisher] |
Full Idea: In three-valued logic (L3), neither the law of excluded middle (p or not-p), nor the law of non-contradiction (not(p and not-p)) will be tautologies. If p has the value 'indeterminate' then so will not-p. | |
From: Jennifer Fisher (On the Philosophy of Logic [2008], 07.I) | |
A reaction: I quite accept that the world is full of indeterminate propositions, and that excluded middle and non-contradiction can sometimes be uncertain, but I am reluctant to accept that what is being offered here should be called 'logic'. |
16335 | In Strong Kleene logic a disjunction just needs one disjunct to be true [Halbach] |
Full Idea: In Strong Kleene logic a disjunction of two sentences is true if at least one disjunct is true, even when the other disjunct lacks a truth value. | |
From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth [2011], 18) | |
A reaction: This sounds fine to me. 'Either I'm typing this or Homer had blue eyes' comes out true in any sensible system. |
16334 | In Weak Kleene logic there are 'gaps', neither true nor false if one component lacks a truth value [Halbach] |
Full Idea: In Weak Kleene Logic, with truth-value gaps, a sentence is neither true nor false if one of its components lacks a truth value. A line of the truth table shows a gap if there is a gap anywhere in the line, and the other lines are classical. | |
From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth [2011], 18) | |
A reaction: This will presumably apply even if the connective is 'or', so a disjunction won't be true, even if one disjunct is true, when the other disjunct is unknown. 'Either 2+2=4 or Lot's wife was left-handed' sounds true to me. Odd. |