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2. Reason / D. Definition / 10. Stipulative Definition

[definition by simply decreeing what a concept means]

4 ideas
Frege suggested that mathematics should only accept stipulative definitions [Frege, by Gupta]
     Full Idea: Frege has defended the austere view that, in mathematics at least, only stipulative definitions should be countenanced.
     From: report of Gottlob Frege (Logic in Mathematics [1914]) by Anil Gupta - Definitions 1.3
     A reaction: This sounds intriguingly at odds with Frege's well-known platonism about numbers (as sets of equinumerous sets). It makes sense for other mathematical concepts.
Stipulative definition assigns meaning to a term, ignoring prior meanings [Gupta]
     Full Idea: Stipulative definition imparts a meaning to the defined term, and involves no commitment that the assigned meaning agrees with prior uses (if any) of the term
     From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 1.3)
     A reaction: A nice question is how far one can go in stretching received usage. If I define 'democracy' as 'everyone is involved in decisions', that is sort of right, but pushing the boundaries (children, criminals etc).
A stipulative definition lays down that an expression is to have a certain meaning [Mautner]
     Full Idea: A stipulative definition lays down that a given linguistic expression is to have a certain meaning; this is why they cannot be said to be correct or incorrect.
     From: Thomas Mautner (Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy [1996], 'definition')
     A reaction: These are uncontroversial when they are explicitly made in writing by a single person. The tricky case is where they are implicitly made in conversation by a community. After a century or two these look like facts, their origin having been lost.
Classical definitions attempt to refer, but intuitionist/constructivist definitions actually create objects [Friend]
     Full Idea: In classical logic definitions are thought of as revealing our attempts to refer to objects, ...but for intuitionist or constructivist logics, if our definitions do not uniquely characterize an object, we are not entitled to discuss the object.
     From: Michèle Friend (Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics [2007], 2.4)
     A reaction: In defining a chess piece we are obviously creating. In defining a 'tree' we are trying to respond to fact, but the borderlines are vague. Philosophical life would be easier if we were allowed a mixture of creation and fact - so let's have that.