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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity

[how we should understand the idea of identity]

33 ideas
Two things with the same primary being and essence are one thing [Aristotle]
Identity does not exclude possible or imagined difference [Suárez, by Boulter]
Minor Real distinction: B needs A, but A doesn't need B [Suárez, by Boulter]
Major Real distinction: A and B have independent existences [Suárez, by Boulter]
Real Essential distinction: A and B are of different natural kinds [Suárez, by Boulter]
Conceptual/Mental distinction: one thing can be conceived of in two different ways [Suárez, by Boulter]
Modal distinction: A isn't B or its property, but still needs B [Suárez, by Boulter]
Inequality can be brought infinitely close to equality [Leibniz]
Both number and unity are incompatible with the relation of identity [Hume]
Multiple objects cannot convey identity, because we see them as different [Hume]
Real identity admits of no degrees [Reid]
Identity is familiar to common sense, but very hard to define [Reid]
Identity can only be affirmed of things which have a continued existence [Reid]
The idea of a criterion of identity was introduced by Frege [Frege, by Noonan]
Frege's algorithm of identity is the law of putting equals for equals [Frege, by Quine]
Frege was asking how identities could be informative [Frege, by Perry]
Identity is not a relation between objects [Wittgenstein]
To unite a sequence of ostensions to make one object, a prior concept of identity is needed [Quine]
We know what things are by distinguishing them, so identity is part of ontology [Quine]
The concept of 'identity' must allow for some changes in properties or parts [Martin,CB]
Only abstract things can have specific and full identity specifications [Martin,CB]
When entities contain entities, or overlap with them, there is 'partial' identity [Armstrong]
With the necessity of self-identity plus Leibniz's Law, identity has to be an 'internal' relation [Kripke]
Some say a 'covering concept' completes identity; others place the concept in the reference [Ayers]
Identity is a very weak relation, which doesn't require interdefinability, or shared properties [Perry]
Identity over a time and at a time aren't different concepts [Wiggins]
Hesperus=Hesperus, and Phosphorus=Hesperus, so necessarily Phosphorus=Hesperus [Wiggins]
We should talk of the transitivity of 'identity', and of 'definite identity' [Inwagen]
Identity propositions are not always tautological, and have a key epistemic role [McGinn]
Identities must hold because of other facts, which must be instrinsic [Forbes,G, by Mackie,P]
I can only represent individuals as the same if I do not already represent them as the same [Fine,K]
The relations featured in criteria of identity are always equivalence relations [Hale]
Our notion of identical sets involves identical members, which needs absolute identity [Hawthorne]