11380 | Two things with the same primary being and essence are one thing [Aristotle] |
22143 | Identity does not exclude possible or imagined difference [Suárez, by Boulter] |
22146 | Minor Real distinction: B needs A, but A doesn't need B [Suárez, by Boulter] |
22145 | Major Real distinction: A and B have independent existences [Suárez, by Boulter] |
22144 | Real Essential distinction: A and B are of different natural kinds [Suárez, by Boulter] |
22147 | Conceptual/Mental distinction: one thing can be conceived of in two different ways [Suárez, by Boulter] |
22148 | Modal distinction: A isn't B or its property, but still needs B [Suárez, by Boulter] |
19394 | Inequality can be brought infinitely close to equality [Leibniz] |
1207 | Both number and unity are incompatible with the relation of identity [Hume] |
21290 | Multiple objects cannot convey identity, because we see them as different [Hume] |
11874 | Real identity admits of no degrees [Reid] |
21320 | Identity is familiar to common sense, but very hard to define [Reid] |
1367 | Identity can only be affirmed of things which have a continued existence [Reid] |
16022 | The idea of a criterion of identity was introduced by Frege [Frege, by Noonan] |
11100 | Frege's algorithm of identity is the law of putting equals for equals [Frege, by Quine] |
4893 | Frege was asking how identities could be informative [Frege, by Perry] |
6056 | Identity is not a relation between objects [Wittgenstein] |
17595 | To unite a sequence of ostensions to make one object, a prior concept of identity is needed [Quine] |
18965 | We know what things are by distinguishing them, so identity is part of ontology [Quine] |
15475 | The concept of 'identity' must allow for some changes in properties or parts [Martin,CB] |
15486 | Only abstract things can have specific and full identity specifications [Martin,CB] |
18389 | When entities contain entities, or overlap with them, there is 'partial' identity [Armstrong] |
16981 | With the necessity of self-identity plus Leibniz's Law, identity has to be an 'internal' relation [Kripke] |
17509 | Some say a 'covering concept' completes identity; others place the concept in the reference [Ayers] |
4885 | Identity is a very weak relation, which doesn't require interdefinability, or shared properties [Perry] |
11843 | Identity over a time and at a time aren't different concepts [Wiggins] |
11864 | Hesperus=Hesperus, and Phosphorus=Hesperus, so necessarily Phosphorus=Hesperus [Wiggins] |
17588 | We should talk of the transitivity of 'identity', and of 'definite identity' [Inwagen] |
6058 | Identity propositions are not always tautological, and have a key epistemic role [McGinn] |
11888 | Identities must hold because of other facts, which must be instrinsic [Forbes,G, by Mackie,P] |
15603 | I can only represent individuals as the same if I do not already represent them as the same [Fine,K] |
10522 | The relations featured in criteria of identity are always equivalence relations [Hale] |
8970 | Our notion of identical sets involves identical members, which needs absolute identity [Hawthorne] |