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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind

[picking out things by giving their kind]

40 ideas
Genus and species are substances, because only they reveal the primary substance [Wedin on Aristotle]
Individuals within a species differ in their matter, form and motivating cause [Aristotle]
Genus gives the essence better than the differentiae do [Aristotle]
I speak of a 'sortal' name, from the word 'sort' [Locke]
Recognising continuity is separate from sortals, and must precede their use [Ayers]
Speakers need the very general category of a thing, if they are to think about it [Ayers]
We use sortals to classify physical objects by the nature and origin of their unity [Ayers]
Seeing caterpillar and moth as the same needs continuity, not identity of sortal concepts [Ayers]
Brody bases sortal essentialism on properties required throughout something's existence [Mackie,P on Brody]
'Ultimate sortals' cannot explain ontological categories [Westerhoff on Wiggins]
A thing is necessarily its highest sortal kind, which entails an essential constitution [Strawson,P on Wiggins]
A sortal essence is a thing's principle of individuation [Mackie,P on Wiggins]
Wiggins's sortal essentialism rests on a thing's principle of individuation [Mackie,P on Wiggins]
'Sortalism' says parts only compose a whole if it falls under a sort or kind [Hossack on Wiggins]
Identity a=b is only possible with some concept to give persistence and existence conditions [Strawson,P on Wiggins]
The evening star is the same planet but not the same star as the morning star, since it is not a star [Wiggins]
Many predicates are purely generic, or pure determiners, rather than sortals [Wiggins]
The possibility of a property needs an essential sortal concept to conceive it [Wiggins]
The only singling out is singling out 'as' something [Wiggins]
In Aristotle's sense, saying x falls under f is to say what x is [Wiggins]
Every determinate thing falls under a sortal, which fixes its persistence [Wiggins]
Sortal predications are answers to the question 'what is x?' [Wiggins]
A river may change constantly, but not in respect of being a river [Wiggins]
Sortal classification becomes science, with cross reference clarifying individuals [Wiggins]
If the kinds are divided realistically, they fall into substances [Wiggins]
'Human being' is a better answer to 'what is it?' than 'poet', as the latter comes in degrees [Wiggins]
Secondary substances correctly divide primary substances by activity-principles and relations [Wiggins]
We never single out just 'this', but always 'this something-or-other' [Wiggins]
Sortal concepts cannot require that things don't survive their loss, because of phase sortals [Wright,C]
Persistence conditions cannot contradict, so there must be a 'dominant sortal' [Hawley on Burke,M]
The 'dominant' of two coinciding sortals is the one that entails the widest range of properties [Sider on Burke,M]
It is incoherent to think that a given entity depends on its kind for its existence [Jubien]
Individuation principles identify what kind it is; identity criteria distinguish items of the same kind [Lowe]
If sortal terms fix the kind and the persistence conditions, we need to know what kinds there are [Sider]
Sortal nouns for continuants tell you their continuance- and cessation-conditions [Simons]
No sortal could ever exactly pin down which set of particles count as this 'cup' [Schaffer,J]
We 'individuate' kinds of object, and 'identify' particular specimens [Macdonald]
'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA]
If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA]
Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA]