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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity

[can possible things be the same as actual things?]

30 ideas
A horse would be destroyed if it were changed into a man or an insect [Spinoza]
If varieties of myself can be conceived of as distinct from me, then they are not me [Leibniz]
If someone's life went differently, then that would be another individual [Leibniz]
To know an object you must know all its possible occurrences [Wittgenstein]
Can an unactualized possible have self-identity, and be distinct from other possibles? [Quine]
We can't quantify in modal contexts, because the modality depends on descriptions, not objects [Fine,K on Quine]
Could possible Adams gradually transform into Noah, and vice versa? [Chisholm]
What Socrates could have been, and could have become, are different? [Plantinga]
If we discuss what might have happened to Nixon, we stipulate that it is about Nixon [Kripke]
Transworld identification is unproblematic, because we stipulate that we rigidly refer to something [Kripke]
A table in some possible world should not even be identified by its essential properties [Kripke]
Identification across possible worlds does not need properties, even essential ones [Kripke]
If possible Socrates differs from actual Socrates, the Indiscernibility of Identicals says they are different [Plantinga]
It doesn't matter that we can't identify the possible Socrates; we can't identify adults from baby photos [Plantinga]
If individuals can only exist in one world, then they can never lack any of their properties [Plantinga]
The simplest solution to transworld identification is to adopt bare particulars [Kaplan]
Why imagine that Babe Ruth might be a billiard ball; nothing useful could be said about the ball [Stalnaker]
Possible worlds identity needs a sortal [Gibbard]
Only concepts, not individuals, can be the same across possible worlds [Gibbard]
Transworld identity concerns the limits of possibility for ordinary things [Forbes,G]
The problem of transworld identity can be solved by individual essences [Forbes,G]
□ must be sensitive as to whether it picks out an object by essential or by contingent properties [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Objects retain their possible properties across worlds, so a bundle theory of them seems best [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds [Fitting]
Even extreme modal realists might allow transworld identity for abstract objects [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
Necessity of identity seems trivial, because it leaves out the real essence [Oderberg]
Transworld identity is not a problem in de dicto sentences, which needn't identify an individual [Sider]
The individuals and kinds involved in modality are also a matter of convention [Sidelle]
The limits of change for an individual depend on the kind of individual [Simons]
Transworld identity without individual essences leads to 'bare identities' [Mackie,P]