structure for 'Modality'    |     alphabetical list of themes    |     unexpand these ideas

---

10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 3. Necessity by Convention

[necessity comes from linguistic conventions]

11 ideas

18726	For each necessity in the world there is an arbitrary rule of language [Wittgenstein]
	Full Idea: To a necessity in the world there corresponds an arbitrary rule in language.
	From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Lectures 1930-32 (student notes) [1931], B XIV.2)
	A reaction: This seems to be hardcore logical positivism, making all necessities arbitrary. Compare Quine on the number of planets.

15233	If natural necessity is used to include or exclude some predicate, the predicate is conceptually necessary [Harré/Madden]
	Full Idea: When a natural necessity is used as the basis for the inclusion or exclusion of the appropriate predicate in the meaning of a concept of a kind of particular, then it is conceptually necessary that that kind of particular has that property or power.
	From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 1.V.B)
	A reaction: This is one of the bolder views of Harré and Madden, since many philosophers would say that conceptual necessity rests entirely on convention rather than on nature. We could cut them out by just saying that most of our conventions rest on nature.

15242	Having a child is contingent for a 'man', necessary for a 'father'; the latter reflects a necessity of nature [Harré/Madden]
	Full Idea: Described as a man it is quite contingent that he has a child, but described as a father it is conceptually necessary that he has a child. But that conceptual necessity is a reflection of the natural necessity of the father's role in reproduction.
	From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 3.I)
	A reaction: This is a (good) response to Quine's claim that necessity depends entirely on the mode of description (and his mathematician cyclist example).

13973	A key achievement of Kripke is showing that important modalities are not linguistic in source [Soames]
	Full Idea: None of Kripke's many achievements is more important than his breaking the spell of the linguistic as the source of philosophically important modalities.
	From: Scott Soames (Significance of the Kripkean Nec A Posteriori [2006], p.186)
	A reaction: Put like that, Kripke may have had the single most important thought of modern times. I take good philosophy to be exactly the same as good scientific theorising, in that it all arises out of the nature of reality (and I include logic in that).

12433	If necessity rests on linguistic conventions, those are contingent, so there is no necessity [Hale]
	Full Idea: If the alleged necessity, e,g, 2+2=4, really does depend upon a convention governing the use of the words in which we state it, and the existence of that convention is merely a contingent matter, then it can't after all be necessary.
	From: Bob Hale (The Source of Necessity [2002], p.302)
	A reaction: [Hale is citing Blackburn for this claim] Hale suggests replies, by keeping truth and meaning separate, and involving laws of logic. Blackburn clearly has a good point.

15028	Conventionalism doesn't seem to apply to examples of the necessary a posteriori [Sider]
	Full Idea: Conventionalism is apparently inapplicable to Kripke's and Putnam's examples of the necessary a posteriori (and, relatedly, to de re modality).
	From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 12.1)
	A reaction: [Sidelle 1989 discusses this]

15027	If truths are necessary 'by convention', that seems to make them contingent [Sider]
	Full Idea: If □φ says that φ is true by convention, then □φ would apparently turn out to be contingent, since statements about what conventions we adopt are not themselves true by convention. The main axioms of S4 and S5 would be false.
	From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 12.1)

15032	Necessary a posteriori is conventional for necessity and nonmodal for a posteriority [Sidelle, by Sider]
	Full Idea: Sidelle defends conventionalism against a posteriori necessities by 'factoring' a necessary a posteriori truth into an analytic component and a nonmodal component. The modal force then comes from the analytic part, and the a posteriority from the other.
	From: report of Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989]) by Theodore Sider - Writing the Book of the World 12.8
	A reaction: [I note that Sidelle refers, it seems, to the nonmodal component as a 'deep explanatory feature', which is exactly what I take an essence to be].

15179	To know empirical necessities, we need empirical facts, plus conventions about which are necessary [Sidelle]
	Full Idea: What we need to know, in order to know what is empirically necessary, is some empirical fact plus our conventions that tell us which truths are necessary given which empirical facts.
	From: Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.4)
	A reaction: I take this attack on a posteriori necessities to be the most persuasive part of Sidelle's case, but you can't just put all of our truths down to convention. There are stabilities in the world, as well as in our conventions.

6582	Conventions can only work if they are based on something non-conventional [Fogelin]
	Full Idea: Convention, to exist at all, must have a basis in something that is not conventional; conventions, to work, need something nonconventional to build upon and shape.
	From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.3)
	A reaction: Fogelin attributes his point to Hume. I agree entirely. No convention could ever possibly catch on in a society unless there were some point to it. If you can't see a point to a convention (like wearing ties) then start looking, because it's there.

14478	Modal Conventionalism says modality is analytic, not intrinsic to the world, and linguistic [Thomasson]
	Full Idea: Modal Conventionalism has at least three theses: 1) modal truths are either analytic truths, or combine analytic and empirical truths, 2) modal properties are not intrinsic features of the world, 3) modal propositions depend on linguistic conventions.
	From: Amie L. Thomasson (Ordinary Objects [2007], 03.2)
	A reaction: [She cites Alan Sidelle 1989 for this view] I disagree mainly with number 2), since I take dispositions to be key intrinsic features of nature, and I interpret dispositions as modal properties.