6402
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In 1927, Russell analysed force and matter in terms of events
[Russell, by Grayling]
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Full Idea:
In his 'Analysis of Matter' (1927), Russell sought to analyse the chief concepts of physics, such as force and matter, in terms of events.
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From:
report of Bertrand Russell (The Analysis of Matter [1927]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.2
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A reaction:
My immediate reaction is that this is not very promising, simply because we can always ask why a particular event occurred, and this seems to point to a deeper level in the analysis. See Idea 4779, for example.
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7949
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Varied descriptions of an event will explain varied behaviour relating to it
[Davidson, by Macdonald,C]
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Full Idea:
Davidson points out that we can only make sense of patterns of behaviour such as excuses if events can have more than one description. So I flip the light switch, turn on the light, illuminate the room, and alert a prowler, but I do only one thing.
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From:
report of Donald Davidson (Action, Reasons and Causes [1963]) by Cynthia Macdonald - Varieties of Things Ch.5
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A reaction:
We can distinguish an event as an actual object, and as an intentional object. We can probably individuate intentional events quite well (according to our interests), but actual 'events' seem to flow into one another and overlap.
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8348
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If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk
[Davidson]
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Full Idea:
The assumption, ontological and metaphysical, that there are events, is one without which we cannot make sense of much of our most common talk.
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From:
Donald Davidson (Causal Relations [1967], §4)
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A reaction:
He considers events to be unanalysable basics. Explanation of normal talk also needs ghosts, premonitions, telepathy and Father Christmas. It is extremely hard to individuate events, unless they are subatomic, and rather numerous.
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14004
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We need events for action statements, causal statements, explanation, mind-and-body, and adverbs
[Davidson, by Bourne]
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Full Idea:
Davidson claims that we require the existence of events in order to make sense of a) action statements, b) causal statements, c) explanation, d) the mind-body problem, and e) the logic of adverbial modification.
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From:
report of Donald Davidson (The Individuation of Events [1969], Intro IIb) by Craig Bourne - A Future for Presentism
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A reaction:
Events are a nice shorthand, but I don't like them in a serious ontology. Prior says there objects and what happens to them; Kim reduces events to other things. Processes are more clearly individuated than events.
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15268
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Humeans construct their objects from events, but we construct events from objects
[Harré/Madden]
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Full Idea:
On our view, 'event' is to be understood in terms of the ontology of enduring things, while on the Humean view enduring things are conceived to be constructions of events.
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From:
Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 6.IV)
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A reaction:
It has quite hard to take either objects or events, given that they seem to be amenable to analysis. I am tempted to take essences as primitive. They fix identity, endure change, bear accidental properties (including temporary intrinsics).
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12839
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Relativity has an ontology of things and events, not on space-time diagrams
[Simons]
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Full Idea:
A closer examination of the concepts and principles of relativity shows that they rest squarely on an ontology of things and events (not on convenient 'space-time diagrams'). Acceleration concerns non-zero mass, but only continuants can have a mass.
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From:
Peter Simons (Parts [1987], 3.4)
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A reaction:
The point here is that fans of four-dimensionalism like to claim that they are more in touch with modern physics, because 'time is just another dimension, like space, so objects are spread across it'. Simons sounds right about this.
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