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7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 3. Moments

[treating small units of time as among the things that exist]

4 ideas
Moments are things like smiles or skids, which are founded on other things [Simons]
     Full Idea: A 'moment' is something which is founded on something else. Examples are legion: smiles, headaches, gestures, skids, collisions, fights, thought, all founded on their participants, the continuants involved in them.
     From: Peter Simons (Parts [1987], 8.4)
     A reaction: The idea of a 'moment' and 'foundation' come from Husserl Log. Inv. 3. Simons says moments 'have a bright future in ontology'. It would be better if fewer of his examples involved human beings and their perceptions.
Moving disturbances are are moments which continuously change their basis [Simons]
     Full Idea: Moving disturbances are a special and interesting kind of continuant: moments which continuously change their fundaments.
     From: Peter Simons (Parts [1987], 8.5)
     A reaction: [a smile is a moment, and the face its fundament] I'm thinking he's got this wrong. Compare Idea 12882. Disturbances can't be continuants, because the passing of time is essential to them, but not to a continuant.
A smiling is an event with causes, but the smile is a continuant without causes [Simons]
     Full Idea: A smiling, being an event, has causes and effects, whereas the smile thereby produced is a continuant, and has itself neither causes nor effects.
     From: Peter Simons (Parts [1987], 8.5)
     A reaction: This is dogmatic, hopeful and a bit dubious. Simons is very scathing about processes in ontology. There seem to be two descriptions, with distinctive syntax, but it is hard to believe that in reality we have two types of thing present.
A wave is maintained by a process, but it isn't a process [Simons]
     Full Idea: A wave is maintained by a process transferring motion from particle to particle of the medium, but it is not identical with this process.
     From: Peter Simons (Parts [1987], 8.5)
     A reaction: I'm inclined to think of the mind as a process. There are some 'things' which only seem to exist if they have a duration. Bricks can be instantaneous, but minds and waves can't. A wave isn't a continuant. A hill isn't a wave.