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1400
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Some cause must unite the separate temporal sections of a person
[Descartes]
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Full Idea:
Because the entire span of one's life can be divided into countless parts, each one wholly independent of the rest, it does not follow from the fact that I existed a short time ago that I exist now, unless some cause creates and preserves me each moment.
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From:
René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §3.49)
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A reaction:
How could I 'prove' that this computer is the same computer as it was five minutes ago, even after I have accepted the straightforward existence of the computer? This is the Enlightenment Project, the mad desire to prove absolutely everything.
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1202
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A person is intelligent, rational, self-aware, continuous, conscious
[Locke]
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Full Idea:
A person is a thinking, intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places; which it does by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking.
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From:
John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 2.27.09)
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A reaction:
Locke's famous definition of a person. Several of the terms seem redundant, and it seems to come down to 'conscious, rational, and self-aware'. But 'self-aware' also seems redundant, because you must already be a person to be aware of it…
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3238
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'Dead person' isn't a contradiction, so 'person' is somewhat vague
[Williams,B]
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Full Idea:
If we say (in opposition to a physical view of identity) that when Jones dies 'Jones ceases to exist' but 'Jones' body does not cease to exist', this shouldn't be pressed too hard, because it would make 'dead person' a contradiction.
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From:
Bernard Williams (Are Persons Bodies? [1970], p.74)
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A reaction:
A good point, which nicely challenges the distinction between a 'human' and a 'person', but the problem case is much more the one where Jones gets advanced Alzheimer's, rather than dies. A dead body ceases as a mechanism, as well as as a personality.
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3239
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You can only really love a person as a token, not as a type
[Williams,B]
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Full Idea:
If you love a person as a type instead of as a token (i.e. a "person", instead of a physical body) you might prefer a run-down copy of them to no person at all, but at this point our idea of loving a person begins to crack.
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From:
Bernard Williams (Are Persons Bodies? [1970], p.81)
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A reaction:
Very persuasive. If you love a person you can cope with them getting old. If you own an original watercolour, you can accept that it fades, but you would replace a reproduction of it if that faded. But what, then, is it that you love?
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20618
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Persons must be conscious, reasoning, motivated, communicative, self-aware
[Warren, by Tuckness/Wolf]
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Full Idea:
Suggested characteristics of personhood: consciousness (esp. of pain); reasoning and problem solving; self-motivated activity; varied communication on many topics; self-concepts and self-awareness.
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From:
report of Mary Anne Warren (On the Moral and Legal State of Abortion [1973], p.55) by Tuckness,A/Wolf,C - This is Political Philosophy 8 'Standing'
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A reaction:
[a 'famous' article] A number of non-human animals come very close to passing these tests. I suspect the complex communication is only in there to disqualify them from getting the full certificate. (But she wrote on animal rights).
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4669
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Persons are conscious, they relate, they think, they feel, and they are self-aware
[Glover]
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Full Idea:
We think of 'persons' as conscious, able to form relationships, capable of thought, having emotional responses, and having some sense of their own identity.
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From:
Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §9.4)
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A reaction:
A notable addition to Locke's definition is the capacity for relationships. So are autistic children not persons? Is feeling necessary? Mr Spock is then in trouble.
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