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5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / c. Berry's paradox

[problem with defining a number with maximum words]

4 ideas
Berry's Paradox considers the meaning of 'The least number not named by this name' [Bostock]
     Full Idea: Berry's Paradox can be put in this form, by considering the alleged name 'The least number not named by this name'.
     From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 8.1)
Berry's Paradox: we succeed in referring to a number, with a term which says we can't do that [Hart,WD]
     Full Idea: Berry's Paradox: by the least number principle 'the least number denoted by no description of fewer than 79 letters' exists, but we just referred to it using a description of 77 letters.
     From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 3)
     A reaction: I struggle with this. If I refer to 'an object to which no human being could possibly refer', have I just referred to something? Graham Priest likes this sort of idea.
Berry's Paradox finds a contradiction in the naming of huge numbers [Brown,JR]
     Full Idea: Berry's Paradox refers to 'the least integer not namable in fewer than nineteen syllables' - a paradox because it has just been named in eighteen syllables.
     From: James Robert Brown (Philosophy of Mathematics [1999], Ch. 5)
     A reaction: Apparently George Boolos used this quirky idea as a basis for a new and more streamlined proof of Gödel's Theorem. Don't tell me you don't find that impressive.
'x is a natural number definable in less than 19 words' leads to contradiction [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: Berry: if we take 'x is a natural number definable in less than 19 words', we can generate a number which is and is not one of these numbers.
     From: Graham Priest (The Structure of Paradoxes of Self-Reference [1994], §3)
     A reaction: [not enough space to spell this one out in full]