16300 | Ockham had an early axiomatic account of truth [Halbach on William of Ockham] |
15716 | If axioms and their implications have no contradictions, they pass my criterion of truth and existence [Hilbert] |
19190 | We need an undefined term 'true' in the meta-language, specified by axioms [Tarski] |
15322 | Tarski's had the first axiomatic theory of truth that was minimally adequate [Horsten on Tarski] |
16306 | Tarski defined truth, but an axiomatisation can be extracted from his inductive clauses [Halbach on Tarski] |
19141 | Tarski thought axiomatic truth was too contingent, and in danger of inconsistencies [Davidson on Tarski] |
14967 | Certain three-valued languages can contain their own truth predicates [Gupta on Kripke] |
14966 | The Tarskian move to a metalanguage may not be essential for truth theories [Gupta on Kripke] |
19137 | We can get a substantive account of Tarski's truth by adding primitive 'true' to the object language [Etchemendy] |
15332 | 'Reflexive' truth theories allow iterations (it is T that it is T that p) [Horsten] |
15346 | Axiomatic approaches to truth avoid the regress problem of semantic theories [Horsten] |
15350 | The Naďve Theory takes the bi-conditionals as axioms, but it is inconsistent, and allows the Liar [Horsten] |
15351 | Axiomatic theories take truth as primitive, and propose some laws of truth as axioms [Horsten] |
15361 | A good theory of truth must be compositional (as well as deriving biconditionals) [Horsten] |
15367 | By adding truth to Peano Arithmetic we increase its power, so truth has mathematical content! [Horsten] |
15371 | An axiomatic theory needs to be of maximal strength, while being natural and sound [Horsten] |
15373 | Axiomatic approaches avoid limiting definitions to avoid the truth predicate, and limited sizes of models [Horsten] |
16294 | Axiomatic truth doesn't presuppose a truth-definition, though it could admit it at a later stage [Halbach] |
16326 | The main semantic theories of truth are Kripke's theory, and revisions semantics [Halbach] |
16299 | Gödel numbering means a theory of truth can use Peano Arithmetic as its base theory [Halbach] |
16340 | Truth axioms need a base theory, because that is where truth issues arise [Halbach] |
16305 | We know a complete axiomatisation of truth is not feasible [Halbach] |
16311 | To axiomatise Tarski's truth definition, we need a binary predicate for his 'satisfaction' [Halbach] |
16313 | A theory is 'conservative' if it adds no new theorems to its base theory [PG on Halbach] |
16315 | The Tarski Biconditional theory TB is Peano Arithmetic, plus truth, plus all Tarski bi-conditionals [Halbach] |
16318 | Compositional Truth CT has the truth of a sentence depending of the semantic values of its constituents [Halbach] |
16322 | CT proves PA consistent, which PA can't do on its own, so CT is not conservative over PA [Halbach] |
16314 | Theories of truth are 'typed' (truth can't apply to sentences containing 'true'), or 'type-free' [Halbach] |
15648 | Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach] |
15650 | Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach] |
15655 | Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach] |
15654 | If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach] |
19124 | A natural theory of truth plays the role of reflection principles, establishing arithmetic's soundness [Halbach/Leigh] |
19126 | If deflationary truth is not explanatory, truth axioms should be 'conservative', proving nothing new [Halbach/Leigh] |