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14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem

[problem of a predicate which changes over time]

20 ideas
Goodman argued that the confirmation relation can never be formalised [Goodman, by Horsten/Pettigrew]
Goodman showed that every sound inductive argument has an unsound one of the same form [Goodman, by Putnam]
Grue and green won't be in the same world, as that would block induction entirely [Goodman]
Grue is a puzzle because the notions of similarity and kind are dubious in science [Quine]
Unlike 'green', the 'grue' predicate involves a time and a change [Armstrong]
Science suggests that the predicate 'grue' is not a genuine single universal [Armstrong]
Emeralds are naturally green, and only an external force could turn them blue [Ellis]
'Grue' introduces a new causal hypothesis - that emeralds can change colour [Harré]
The grue problem shows that natural kinds are central to science [Harré]
'Grue' only has causal features because of its relation to green [Shoemaker]
Grueness is not, unlike green and blue, associated with causal potential [Shoemaker]
To just expect unexamined emeralds to be grue would be totally unreasonable [Lewis]
Observing lots of green x can confirm 'all x are green' or 'all x are grue', where 'grue' is arbitrary [Mautner, by PG]
Predictions are bound to be arbitrary if they depend on the language used [Bernecker/Dretske]
Problem predicates in induction don't reflect the structure of nature [Sider]
Two applications of 'grue' do not guarantee a similarity between two things [Sider]
Any conclusion can be drawn from an induction, if we use grue-like predicates [Bird]
Several months of observing beech trees supports the deciduous and evergreen hypotheses [Bird]
We normally learn natural kinds from laws, but Goodman shows laws require prior natural kinds [Bird]
'Grue' is not a colour [Milsted]