602 | Some fools think you cannot define anything, but only say what it is like [Antisthenes (I), by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: There is an application of that old chestnut of the cynic Antisthenes' followers (and other buffoons of that kind). Their claim was that a definition of what something is is impossible. You cannot define silver, though you can say it is like tin. | |
From: report of Antisthenes (Ath) (fragments/reports [c.405 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1043b |
5619 | No a priori concept can be defined [Kant] |
Full Idea: Strictly speaking no concept given a priori can be defined, e.g. substance, cause, right, equity, etc. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B756/A728) | |
A reaction: A passing remark with large and interesting implications. A huge amount of ink has been spilled over whether to take concepts such as identity, truth, goodness and substance as 'basic', or reduce them to something else. |
22201 | The use of mathematical-style definitions in philosophy is fruitless and harmful [Husserl] |
Full Idea: Definition cannot take the same form in philosophy as it does in mathematics; the imitation of mathematical procedure is invariably in this respect not only unfruitful, but perverse and most harmful in its consequences. | |
From: Edmund Husserl (Ideas: intro to pure phenomenology [1913], Intro) | |
A reaction: A hundred years of analytic philosophy has entirely ignored this warning. My heart has always sunk when I read '=def...' in a philosophy article (which is usually American). The illusion of rigour. |
14115 | Definition by analysis into constituents is useless, because it neglects the whole [Russell] |
Full Idea: A definition as an analysis of an idea into its constituents is inconvenient and, I think, useless; it overlooks the fact that wholes are not, as a rule, determinate when their constituents are given. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §108) | |
A reaction: The influence of Leibniz seems rather strong here, since he was obsessed with explaining what creates true unities. |
14159 | In mathematics definitions are superfluous, as they name classes, and it all reduces to primitives [Russell] |
Full Idea: The statement that a class is to be represented by a symbol is a definition in mathematics, and says nothing about mathematical entities. Any formula can be stated in terms of primitive ideas, so the definitions are superfluous. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §412) | |
A reaction: [compressed wording] I'm not sure that everyone would agree with this (e.g. Kit Fine), as certain types of numbers seem to be introduced by stipulative definitions. |
12619 | We have no successful definitions, because they all use indefinable words [Fodor] |
Full Idea: There are practically no defensible examples of definitions; for all the examples we've got, practically all the words (/concepts) are undefinable. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (Concepts:where cogn.science went wrong [1998], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: I don't think a definition has to be defined all the way down. Aristotle is perfectly happy if you can get a concept you don't understand down to concepts you do. Understanding is the test, not further definitions. |
9331 | How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich] |
Full Idea: How are we to determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? | |
From: Paul Horwich (Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority [2000], §2) | |
A reaction: Nice question. If I say 'philosophy is the love of wisdom' and 'philosophy bores me', why should one be part of its definition and the other not? What if I stipulated that the second one is part of my definition, and the first one isn't? |
12585 | Most people can't even define a chair [Peacocke] |
Full Idea: Ordinary speakers are notoriously unsuccessful if asked to offer an explicit definition of the concept 'chair'. | |
From: Christopher Peacocke (A Study of Concepts [1992], 6.1) |
14981 | Philosophical concepts are rarely defined, and are not understood by means of definitions [Sider] |
Full Idea: Philosophical concepts of interest are rarely reductively defined; still more rarely does our understanding of such concepts rest on definitions. ...(We generally understand concepts to the extent that we know what role they play in thinking). | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 02.1) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure that I agree with this. I suspect that Sider has the notion of definition in mind that is influenced by lexicography. Aristotle's concept of definition I take to be lengthy and expansive, and that is very relevant to philosophy. |
15015 | It seems possible for a correct definition to be factually incorrect, as in defining 'contact' [Sider] |
Full Idea: Arguably, 'there is absolutely no space between two objects in contact' is false, but definitional of 'contact'. ...We need a word for true definitional sentences. I propose: 'analytic'. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 09.8) |
20391 | Feminists warn that ideologies use timeless objective definitions as a tool of repression [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: According to the feminist critique, ideologies that operate as tools of political repression are falsely represented as definitions possessing a timeless, natural, asocial, universal objectivity. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 2.2) | |
A reaction: I suppose this does not just apply to definitions, but to all expressions of ideologically repressive strategy. I'm trying to think of an example of a specifically feminist problem case. Davies doesn't cite anyone. |