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21408
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For any subject, its system of non-experiential concepts needs a metaphysics
[Kant]
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Full Idea:
A philosophy of any subject (a system of rational knowledge from concepts) requires a system of pure rational concepts independent of any conditions of intuition, that is, a metaphysics.
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From:
Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 375 Pref)
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A reaction:
'Pure rational concepts' must be a priori, and (in Kant's case) transcendental - i.e. discovered from the study of presuppositions. Does this actually say that the philosophies of science, biology, psychology, economics etc each needs a metaphysics?
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21764
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Thought about being leads to a string of other concepts, like becoming, quantity, specificity, causality...
[Hegel, by Houlgate]
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Full Idea:
In the course of (Hegel's) logic, we come to understand that to think being is to think becoming, quality, quantity, specificity, essence and existence, substance and causality, and, ultimately, self-determining reason itself.
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From:
report of Georg W.F.Hegel (Science of Logic [1816]) by Stephen Houlgate - An Introduction to Hegel 02 'The Method'
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A reaction:
Extraordinary! Houlgate spells out nicely what some commentators seem to gloss over, the huge a priori ambitions of Hegel's thought. I find his entire programme utterly implausible.
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21769
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We must start with absolute abstraction, with no presuppositions, so we start with pure being
[Hegel]
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Full Idea:
The beginning must be an absolute - an abstract beginning; and so it may not presuppose anything, must not be mediated by anything or have a ground; rather it is itself to be the ground of the entire science. ...The beginning therefore is pure being.
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From:
Georg W.F.Hegel (Science of Logic [1816], p.70), quoted by Stephen Houlgate - An Introduction to Hegel 03 'Logic'
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A reaction:
This is the 'presuppositionless' beginning of Hegel's metaphysics, which Houlgate emphasises. Hegel's logic is very obviously a direct descendent of Descartes' Cogito. But it is pure thought, with no mention of a Self.
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19219
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Metaphysical reasoning is simple enough, but the concepts are very hard
[Peirce]
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Full Idea:
Metaphysical reasonings, such as they have hitherto been, have been simple enough for the most part. It is the metaphysical concepts which it is difficult to apprehend.
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From:
Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], I)
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A reaction:
Peirce is not, of course, saying that it is just conceptual, because for him science comes first. It is the woolly concepts that alienate some people from metaphysics. Metaphysicians should challenge the concepts they use much, much more!
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20352
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Nietzsche has a metaphysics, as well as perspectives - the ontology is the perspectives
[Nietzsche, by Richardson]
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Full Idea:
Nietzsche's thought includes both a metaphysics and a perspectivism, once these are more complexly grasped. But I argue that the metaphysics is basic: it's an ontology of perspectives.
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From:
report of Friedrich Nietzsche (Works (refs to 8 vol Colli and Montinari) [1885]) by John Richardson - Nietzsche's System Intro
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A reaction:
Very good. If it was just gormless relativism, which is what many people hope for in Nietzsche, why is it many perspectives? If they are just relative, having lots of them is no help. The point is they sum, and increase verisimilitude.
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11103
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We aren't stuck with our native conceptual scheme; we can gradually change it
[Quine]
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Full Idea:
We must not leap to the fatalistic conclusion that we are stuck with the conceptual scheme that we grew up in. We can change it bit by bit, plank by plank.
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From:
Willard Quine (Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis [1950], 5)
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A reaction:
This is an interesting commitment to Strawson's 'revisionary' metaphysics, rather than its duller cousin 'descriptive' metaphysics. Good for Quine. Remember, though, Davidson's 'On the Very Idea of Conceptual Scheme'.
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15801
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Many philosophers aim to understand metaphysics by studying ourselves
[Chisholm]
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Full Idea:
Leibniz, Reid, Brentano and others have held that, by considering certain obvious facts about ourselves, we can arrive at an understanding of the general principles of metaphysics. The present book is intended to confirm that view.
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From:
Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], Intro 1)
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A reaction:
I sympathise, but don't really agree. I see metaphysics as a process of filtering ourselves out of the picture, leaving an account of how things actually are.
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7922
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Descriptive metaphysics concerns unchanging core concepts and categories
[Strawson,P]
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Full Idea:
Descriptive metaphysics is primarily concerned with categories and concepts which, in their fundamental character, change not at all. They are the commonplaces of the least refined thinking, and the indispensable core for the most sophisticated humans.
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From:
Peter F. Strawson (Individuals:Essay in Descript Metaphysics [1959], Intro)
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A reaction:
This seems to be the basic premise for a modern metaphysician such as E.J.Lowe, though such thinkers are not averse to suggesting clarifications of our conceptual scheme. The aim must be good foundations for a successful edifice of knowledge.
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15169
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Metaphysics is clarifying how we speak and think (and possibly improving it)
[Sidelle]
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Full Idea:
Metaphysics, for the conventionalist, is not a matter of trying to see deeply into the structure of mind-independent reality, but of trying to clarify the way we actually speak and think, and perhaps negotiating ways of doing this to our best advantage.
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From:
Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.1)
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A reaction:
Note that he is still allowing space for 'revisionary' as well as for 'descriptive' metaphysics. I can't wholly accept this, as I really do think we can have some deep insights into reality, but Sidelle is articulating a large part of the truth.
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9217
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Modern empirical metaphysics focuses on ontological commitments of discourse, or on presuppositions
[Loux/Zimmerman]
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Full Idea:
The empiricist revival of metaphysics came with Quine, who focused on ontological commitments associated with accepting a body of discourse, and Strawson, asking about the presuppositions of our conceptual practices.
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From:
M Loux / D Zimmerman (Intro to Oxford Hndbk of Metaphysics [2003])
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A reaction:
I find myself preferring the British approach. I can discourse about things without ontological commitment, and utter truths about non-existent things. I really yearn, though, for the third way - actually reasoning towards knowing what's out there.
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16257
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Kant survives in seeing metaphysics as analysing our conceptual system, which is a priori
[Maudlin]
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Full Idea:
The Kantian strain survives in the notion that metaphysics is not about the world, but about our 'conceptual system', especially as what structures our thought about the world. This keeps it a priori, and so not about the world itself.
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From:
Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 3)
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A reaction:
Strawson would embody this view, I suppose. I take our conceptual system to be largely a reflection of (and even creation of) the world, and not just an arbitrary conventional attempt to grasp the world. Analysing concepts partly analyses the world.
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14898
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Modern metaphysics pursues aesthetic criteria like story-writing, and abandons scientific truth
[Ladyman/Ross]
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Full Idea:
The criteria of adequacy for metaphysics have come apart from anything to do with truth. Rather they are internal and peculiar to philosophy, they are semi-aesthetic, and they have more in common with the virtues of story-writing than with science.
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From:
J Ladyman / D Ross (Every Thing Must Go [2007], 1.2.1)
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A reaction:
Part of a sustained polemic against contemporary analytic metaphysics. I love metaphysics, but they may be right. Writers like Sider, Fine, Lowe, Lewis, Stalnaker, Kripke, Armstrong, Dummett seem to tell independent stories, that really are works of art.
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