12134
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Matter is the substratum, which supports both coming-to-be and alteration
[Aristotle]
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Full Idea:
Matter, in the proper sense of the term, is to be identified with the substratum which is receptive of coming-to-be and passing-away; but the substratum of the remaining kinds of change is also matter, because these substrata receive contraries.
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From:
Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 320a03)
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A reaction:
This must be compared with his complex discussion of the role of matter in his Metaphysics, where he has introduced 'form' as the essence of things. I don't think the two texts are inconsistent, but it's tricky... See Idea 12133 on types of change.
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16092
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In Aristotle, bronze only becomes 'matter' when it is potentially a statue
[Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
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Full Idea:
Aristotle implies that matter is parasitic on the being of what it potentially is. …Hence if something is treated as bronze it is regarded as a composite and not as matter; only if it is treated as potentially a statue is it regarded as matter.
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From:
report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], matter) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Ch.1
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A reaction:
Note the distinction we should make of bronze as indeterminate 'stuff', and a lump of specific bronze, which might be a precondition for casting a statue. On Gill's reading, Greek 'matter' is much more specific than the modern word.
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12300
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Aristotle's conception of matter applies to non-physical objects as well as physical objects
[Aristotle, by Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
Aristotle's conception of matter is comprehensive in its scope. It applies, not merely to physical, but also to non-physical objects; for they may have non-physical objects as their matter.
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From:
report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], matter) by Kit Fine - Aristotle on Matter §1
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A reaction:
My plea about bizarre ontological claims is always 'If you claim it exists, tell me what it is made of!' This Aristotle chap now offers them an instant answer to which I have no reply. They are made of 'matter', but not as we know it, Jim.
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12077
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Aristotle's matter is something that could be the inner origin of a natural being's behaviour
[Aristotle, by Witt]
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Full Idea:
Aristotle's notion of matter, unlike ours, is of something that could be the inner origin of a natural being's behaviour.
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From:
report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], matter) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle 3.1
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A reaction:
This conforms with my idea of matter, as something active, containing powers, not some inert stuff waiting for the hand of God to bring it into life.
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12103
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Matter is secondary, because it is potential, determined by the actuality of form
[Aristotle, by Witt]
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Full Idea:
Aristotle's characterization of matter as potentiality and of form as actuality means that the form or essence determines what the matter is. So matter does not have any independent contribution to make to the definition and essence of the substance.
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From:
report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], matter) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle 6.2
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A reaction:
We might say that of the wood which constitutes a lectern, but in the case of a magnet it seems that we are directly encountering the powers of the matter. ...though you might say that iron is the matter and magnetisation the form?
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16083
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Aristotelian matter seriously threatens the intrinsic unity and substantiality of its object
[Gill,ML]
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Full Idea:
On the interpretation of Aristotelian matter that I shall propose, matter seriously threatens the intrinsic unity, and hence the substantiality, of the object to which it contributes.
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From:
Mary Louise Gill (Aristotle on Substance [1989], Intro)
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A reaction:
Presumably the thought is that if an object is form+matter (hylomorphism), then forms are essentially unified, but matter is essentially unified and sloppy.
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13333
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The matter is a relatively unstructured version of the object, like a set without membership structure
[Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
The wood is, as it were, a relatively unstructured version of the tree, just as the set {a,b,c,d} is an unstructured counterpart of the set {{a,b},{c,d}}.
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From:
Kit Fine (Things and Their Parts [1999], §5)
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A reaction:
He is trying to give a modern logicians' account of the Aristotelian concept of 'form' (as applied to matter). It is part of the modern project that objects must be connected to the formalism of mereology or set theory. If it works, are we thereby wiser?
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