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17281
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If grounding is a relation it must be between entities of the same type, preferably between facts
[Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
In so far as ground is regarded as a relation it should be between entities of the same type, and the entities should probably be taken as worldly entities, such as facts, rather than as representational entities, such as propositions.
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From:
Kit Fine (Guide to Ground [2012], 1.02)
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A reaction:
That's more like it (cf. Idea 17280). The consensus of this discussion seems to point to facts as the best relata, for all the vagueness of facts, and the big question of how fine-grained facts should be (and how dependent they are on descriptions).
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15055
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Grounding relations are best expressed as relations between sentences
[Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
I recommend that a statement of ground be cast in the following 'canonical' form: Its being the case that S consists in nothing more than its being the case that T, U... (where S, T, U... are particular sentences).
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From:
Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], 5)
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A reaction:
The point here is that grounding is to be undestood in terms of sentences (and 'its being the case that...'), rather than in terms of objects, properties or relations. Fine thus makes grounding a human activity, rather than a natural activity.
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17314
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The relata of grounding are propositions or facts, but for dependence it is objects and their features
[Koslicki]
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Full Idea:
The relata of the grounding relation are typically taken to be facts or propositions, while the relata of ontological dependence ...are objects and their characteristics, activities, constituents and so on.
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From:
Kathrin Koslicki (Varieties of Ontological Dependence [2012], 7.5 n25)
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A reaction:
Interesting. Good riddance to propositions here, but this seems a bit unfair to facts, since I take facts to be in the world. Audi's concept of 'worldly facts' is what we need here.
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17294
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Grounding is a singular relation between worldly facts
[Audi,P]
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Full Idea:
On my view, grounding is a singular relation between facts. ...Facts, on this view, are obtaining states of affairs.
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From:
Paul Audi (Clarification and Defense of Grounding [2012], 3.2)
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A reaction:
He rest this claim on his 'worldly' view of facts, Idea 17293. I seem to be agreeing with him. Note that it is not between types of fact, even if there are such general truths, such as in chemistry.
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17300
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If grounding relates facts, properties must be included, as well as objects
[Audi,P]
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Full Idea:
Taking facts to be the relata of grounding has the interesting consequence that it does not relate ordinary particulars, objects, considered apart from their properties.
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From:
Paul Audi (Clarification and Defense of Grounding [2012], 3.4)
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A reaction:
It will depend on what you mean by properties, and it seems to me that something like 'powers' must be invoked, to get the active character that seems to be involved in grounding.
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