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3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth

[question of whether truth can be defined, and how]

27 ideas
Jesus said he bore witness to the truth. Pilate asked, What is truth? [John]
Truth is such a transcendentally clear notion that it cannot be further defined [Descartes]
Superficial truth is knowing how something is, which is consciousness of bare correctness [Hegel]
Genuine truth is the resolution of the highest contradiction [Hegel]
Kierkegaard's truth draws on authenticity, fidelity and honesty [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle]
The word 'true' seems to be unique and indefinable [Frege]
You can only define a statement that something is 'true' by referring to its functional possibilities [James]
Definitions of truth should not introduce a new version of the concept, but capture the old one [Tarski]
A definition of truth should be materially adequate and formally correct [Tarski]
A rigorous definition of truth is only possible in an exactly specified language [Tarski]
We may eventually need to split the word 'true' into several less ambiguous terms [Tarski]
Tarski proved that any reasonably expressive language suffers from the liar paradox [Tarski, by Horsten]
Tarski proved that truth cannot be defined from within a given theory [Tarski, by Halbach]
'True sentence' has no use consistent with logic and ordinary language, so definition seems hopeless [Tarski]
In everyday language, truth seems indefinable, inconsistent, and illogical [Tarski]
There is no theory of truth, because it isn't a concept [Wittgenstein]
We must be able to specify truths in a precise language, like winning moves in a game [Dummett]
A comprehensive theory of truth probably includes a theory of predication [Davidson]
Defining truth presupposes that there can be a true definition [Scruton]
If truths are just identical with facts, then truths will make themselves true [David]
We might define truth as arising from the truth-maker relation [MacBride]
Truth has no 'nature', but we should try to describe its behaviour in inferences [Horsten]
Traditional definitions of truth often make it more obscure, rather than less [Halbach]
Any definition of truth requires a metalanguage [Halbach]
If people have big doubts about truth, a definition might give it more credibility [Halbach]
Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach]
If we define truth, we can eliminate it [Halbach/Leigh]