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19. Language / F. Communication / 2. Assertion

[stating something while claiming it is true]

4 ideas
Assertions, unlike sentence meanings, can be accurate, probable, exaggerated, false.... [Cartwright,R]
     Full Idea: Whereas what is asserted can be said to be accurate, exaggerated, unfounded, overdrawn, probable, improbable, plausible, true, or false, none of these can be said of the meaning of a sentence.
     From: Richard Cartwright (Propositions [1962], 12)
     A reaction: That fairly firmly kicks into touch the idea that the assertion is the same as the meaning of the sentence.
An assertion aims to add to the content of a context [Stalnaker, by Magidor]
     Full Idea: Stalnaker starts with the general thesis that the role of a successful assertion of s is to update the context by adding to it the content of s.
     From: report of Robert C. Stalnaker (Assertion [1978]) by Ofra Magidor - Category Mistakes 5.3.2
     A reaction: This is to be compared with criteria of meaningfulness, such as verificationism, and with Grice's rules of conversational implicature. Presumably if you assert what the context presupposes, you fail to assert, without being meaningless.
In logic a proposition means the same when it is and when it is not asserted [Bostock]
     Full Idea: In Modus Ponens where the first premise is 'P' and the second 'P→Q', in the first premise P is asserted but in the second it is not. Yet it must mean the same in both premises, or it would be guilty of the fallacy of equivocation.
     From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 7.2)
     A reaction: This is Geach's thought (leading to an objection to expressivism in ethics, that P means the same even if it is not expressed).
A maxim claims that if we are allowed to assert a sentence, that means it must be true [McGee]
     Full Idea: If our linguistic conventions entitle us to assert a sentence, they thereby make it true, because of the maxim that 'truth is the norm of assertion'.
     From: Vann McGee (Logical Consequence [2014], 8)
     A reaction: You could only really deny that maxim if you had no belief at all in truth, but then you can assert anything you like (with full entitlement). Maybe you can assert anything you like as long as it doesn't upset anyone? Etc.