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22. Metaethics / A. Ethical Ends / 1. Value / b. Objective value

[intrinsic desirability or worth in things]

9 ideas
Supreme cleverness is knowledge of the real value of things [Rochefoucauld]
Every good is essentially relative, for it has its essential nature only in its relation to a desiring will [Schopenhauer]
The thing is intrinsically good if it would be good when nothing else existed [Ross]
Ranking order of desires reveals nothing, because none of them may be considered important [Frankfurt]
What is worthwhile for its own sake alone may be worth very little [Frankfurt]
Total objectivity can't see value, but it sees many people with values [Nagel]
Evil can't be an illusion, because then the illusion that there is evil would be evil [Le Poidevin]
Many reject 'moral realism' because they can't see any truthmakers for normative judgements [Heil]
Aesthetic judgements necessarily require first-hand experience, unlike moral judgements [Gardner]