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22. Metaethics / A. Ethical Ends / 1. Value / e. Ultimate value

[what is most desirable or worthy]

27 ideas
We desire final things just for themselves, and not for the sake of something else [Aristotle]
No one would choose life just for activities not done for their own sake [Aristotle]
There is no absolute good, for even the goodness of God is goodness to us [Hobbes]
If there are different ultimate goods, there will be conflicting good actions, which is impossible [Cumberland]
What is contemplated must have a higher value than contemplation [Kant]
Only a good will can give man's being, and hence the world, a final purpose [Kant]
The categorical imperative says nothing about what our activities and ends should be [MacIntyre on Kant]
Kant may rate two things as finally valuable: having a good will, and deserving happiness [Orsi on Kant]
The good will is unconditionally good, because it is the only possible source of value [Korsgaard on Kant]
We cannot attain all the ideals of every culture, so there cannot be a perfect life [Berlin on Herder]
Reason, love and will are the highest perfections and essence of man - the purpose of his life [Feuerbach]
Philosophy grasps the limits of human reason, and values are beyond it [Nietzsche]
Knowledge, wisdom and goodness only have value relative to a goal [Nietzsche]
Philosophers hate values having an origin, and want values to be self-sufficient [Nietzsche]
All moral judgements ultimately concern the value of ends [Rashdall]
Innocent pleasure, knowledge, and virtue are final values [Orsi on Ross]
At a civilisation's peak values are all that matters, and people unconsciously live by them [Cioran]
Freedom to live according to our own conception of the good is the ultimate value [Nozick]
Teleological theories give the good priority over concern for people [Kymlicka]
Beauty (unlike truth and goodness) is questionable as an ultimate value [Scruton]
Our attitudes include what possibilities we value, and also what is allowable, and unthinkable [Kekes]
Unconditional commitments are our most basic convictions, saying what must never be done [Kekes]
Doing the unthinkable damages ourselves, so it is more basic than any value [Kekes]
An end can't be an ultimate value just because it is useless! [Korsgaard]
If we can't reason about value, we can reason about the unconditional source of value [Korsgaard]
A thing may have final value, which is still derived from other values, or from relations [Orsi]
Maybe final value rests on the extrinsic property of being valued by a rational agent [Orsi]