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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names

[name whose object does not exist]

13 ideas
It is a weakness of natural languages to contain non-denoting names [Frege]
In a logically perfect language every well-formed proper name designates an object [Frege]
Names are meaningless unless there is an object which they designate [Russell]
A name has got to name something or it is not a name [Russell]
An expression is only a name if it succeeds in referring to a real object [Bostock]
It is best to say that a name designates iff there is something for it to designate [Sainsbury]
'Pegasus doesn't exist' is false without Pegasus, yet the absence of Pegasus is its truthmaker [Yablo]
Names function the same way, even if there is no object [Azzouni]
Unreflectively, we all assume there are nonexistents, and we can refer to them [Reimer]
Sentences with empty names can be understood, be co-referential, and even be true [Sawyer]
If sentences have a 'sense', empty name sentences can be understood that way [Sawyer]
Frege's compositional account of truth-vaues makes 'Pegasus doesn't exist' neither true nor false [Sawyer]
Russell implies that all sentences containing empty names are false [Sawyer]