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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality

[reality has a structure of interdependent levels]

6 ideas
If observation goes up a level, we expect the laws of the lower level to remain in force [Wilson,EO]
     Full Idea: When the observer shifts his attention from one level of organisation to the next, as from physics to chemistry, he expects to find obedience to all the laws of the levels below.
     From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.1)
     A reaction: This seems to state a necessary condition of reduction, but not a sufficient one. Wilson points out that new phenomena emerge at higher levels. This principle is similar to Hume's argument against miracles. You don't easily overthrow basic laws.
One location may contain molecules, a metal strip, a key, an opener of doors, and a human tragedy [Lycan]
     Full Idea: One space-time slice may be occupied by a collection of molecules, a metal strip, a key, an allower of entry to hotel rooms, a facilitator of adultery, and a destroyer souls.
     From: William Lycan (Consciousness [1987], 4.3)
     A reaction: Desdemona's handkerchief is a nice example. This sort of remark seems to be felt by some philosophers to be heartless wickedness, and yet it so screamingly self-evident that it is impossible to deny.
Biologists see many organic levels, 'abstract' if seen from below, 'structural' if seen from above [Lycan]
     Full Idea: Biologists don't split living things into a 'structural' level and an 'abstract' level; ..rather, they are organised at many levels, each level 'abstract' with respect to those beneath it, but 'structural' as it realises those levels above it.
     From: William Lycan (Introduction - Ontology [1999], p.9)
     A reaction: This is a very helpful distinction. Compare Idea 4601. It seems to fit well with the 'homuncular' picture of a hierarchical mind, and explains why there are so many levels of description available for mental life.
There are levels of organisation, complexity, description and explanation, but not of reality [Heil]
     Full Idea: We should accept levels of organisation, levels of complexity, levels of description, and levels of explanation, but not the levels of reality favoured by many anti-reductionists. The world is then ontologically, but not analytically, reductive.
     From: John Heil (From an Ontological Point of View [2003], Intro)
     A reaction: This sounds right to me. The crunch questions seem to be whether the boundaries at higher levels of organisation exist lower down, and whether the causal laws of the higher levels can be translated without remainder into lower level laws.
A higher level is 'supervenient' if it is determined by lower levels, but has its own natural laws [Heil]
     Full Idea: 'Supervenience' means lower-level objects and properties suffice for the higher level ones, but the higher level is distinct from its ground, which is reflected in the higher level being governed by distinct laws of nature.
     From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.6)
     A reaction: A nice summary of Davidson's idea. It feels wrong to me. Can I create some 'new laws of nature' by combining things novelly in a laboratory so that a supervenient state emerges. Sounds silly to me. Must we invoke God to achieve this?
A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
     Full Idea: It seems unavoidable that the facts about logically necessary relations between levels of facts are themselves logically distinct further facts, irreducible to the microphysical facts.
     From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], C)
     A reaction: I'm beginning to think that rejecting every theory of reality that is proposed by carefully exposing some infinite regress hidden in it is a rather lazy way to do philosophy. Almost as bad as rejecting anything if it can't be defined.