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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / b. Being and existence

[contrast between being and actual existence]

4 ideas

14161	Many things have being (as topics of propositions), but may not have actual existence [Russell]
	Full Idea: Numbers, the Homeric gods, relations, chimeras and four-dimensional space all have being, for if they were not entities of a kind, we could not make propositions about them. Existence, on the contrary, is the prerogative of some only amongst the beings.
	From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §427)
	A reaction: This is the analytic philosophy account of being (a long way from Heidegger). Contemporary philosophy seems to be full of confusions on this, with many writers claiming existence for things which should only be awarded 'being' status.

16966	Philosophers tend to distinguish broad 'being' from narrower 'existence' - but I reject that [Quine]
	Full Idea: It has been fairly common in philosophy early and late to distinguish between being, as the broadest concept, and existence, as narrower. This is no distinction of mine; I mean 'exist' to cover all there is.
	From: Willard Quine (Existence and Quantification [1966], p.100)
	A reaction: I sort of agree with Quine, but 'being' has a role in philosophy that is not required in science and daily life, as the name of the central problem of ontology, which probably has to be broken down before any progress can happen.

12323	Existence is Being itself, but only as our thought decides it [Badiou]
	Full Idea: Existence is precisely Being itself in as much as thought decides it. And that decision orients thought essentially. ...It is when you decide upon what exists that you bind your thought to Being.
	From: Alain Badiou (Briefings on Existence [1998], 2)
	A reaction: [2nd half p.57] Helpful for us non-Heideggerians to see what is going on. Does this mean that Being is Kant's noumenon?

14253	An object's 'being' isn't existence; there's more to an object than existence, and its nature doesn't include existence [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: It seems wrong to identify the 'being' of an object, its being what it is, with its existence. In one respect existence is too weak; for there is more to an object than mere existence; also too strong, for an object's nature need not include existence.
	From: Kit Fine (Ontological Dependence [1995], I)
	A reaction: The word 'being' has been shockingly woolly, from Parmenides to Heidegger, but if you identify it with a thing's 'nature' that strikes me as much clearer (even if a little misty).