| 11379 | Substance is not a universal, as the former is particular but a universal is shared [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The substance of each thing is something that is peculiar to each thing, not pertaining to anything else, whereas the universal is something common. Indeed, a thing is said to be a universal just if its nature pertains to a plurality. | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1038b10) | |
| A reaction: This should be a warning to those who talk of the 'Aristotelian' view of properties as universals instantiated in the particulars. Once one has pinpointed the substance, the subject of predication, and the essence, no room is left for universals. |
| 12096 | Universals are indeterminate and only known in potential, because they are general [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| Full Idea: The notion of generality provides an explanation for Aristotle's position that the universal - every universal - is indeterminate and, hence, the object of potential knowledge. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], univs) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle 5.3 | |
| A reaction: [See Idea 12095 for knowledge of potential and actual] Now you're talking! The idea that universals are central to true knowledge seems wildly misguided. All knowledge is rooted in particulars, where the highest certainties are to be found. |
| 15034 | Are genera and species real or conceptual? bodies or incorporeal? in sensibles or separate from them? [Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: I shall beg off talking of a) whether genera and species are real or situated in bare thoughts alone, b) whether as real they are bodies or incorporeals, and c) whether they are separated or in sensibles and have their reality in connection with them. | |
| From: Porphyry (Isagoge ('Introduction') [c.295], (2)) | |
| A reaction: This passage, picking up on Aristotle, seems to be the original source that grew into the medievel debate about universals. It seems to rather neatly lay out the agenda for the universals debate which is still with us. |
| 5016 | Five universals: genus, species, difference, property, accident [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: The five commonly enumerated universals are: genus, species, difference, property and accident. | |
| From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.59) | |
| A reaction: Interestingly, this seems to be Descartes passing on his medieval Aristotelian inheritance, in which things are defined by placing them in a class, and then noting what distinguishes them within that class. |
| 6487 | Locke, Berkeley and Hume did no serious thinking about universals [Robinson,H on Locke] |
| Full Idea: None of Locke, Berkeley or Hume shows any sign of serious thinking about the relation of their concepts of quality, idea or impression to the problem of universals; it is as if they thought this issue had disappeared. | |
| From: comment on John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694]) by Howard Robinson - Perception 1.4 | |
| A reaction: Maybe they were right. Personally I think there is a real problem of universals, but the history of philosophy has lots of cases of deep worries about problems that don't seem to bother anyone else. |
| 10533 | We can't get a semantics from nouns and predicates referring to the same thing [Frege, by Dummett] |
| Full Idea: Frege is denying that on a traditional basis we can construct a workable semantics for a language; we can't regard terms like 'wisdom' as standing for the very same thing as the predicate 'x is wise' stands for. | |
| From: report of Gottlob Frege (On Sense and Reference [1892]) by Michael Dummett - Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) Ch.14 | |
| A reaction: This follows from Idea 10532, indicating how to deal with the problem of universals. So predicates refer to concepts, and singular terms to objects. But I see no authoritative way of deciding which is which, given that paraphrases are possible. |
| 5383 | Every complete sentence must contain at least one word (a verb) which stands for a universal [Russell] |
| Full Idea: Every complete sentence must contain at least one word which stands for a universal, since all verbs have a meaning which is universal. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 5) | |
| A reaction: Not all meaningful statements are sentences. One could try a programme of eliminating from discourse all words which imply universals. Daily physical life would survive all right, but universities would close down. |
| 4428 | Propositions express relations (prepositions and verbs) as well as properties (nouns and adjectives) [Russell] |
| Full Idea: In general, adjectives and nouns express properties of things, whereas prepositions and verbs express relations between things, so neglect of the latter led to the belief that every proposition attributes properties rather than relations. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 9) | |
| A reaction: A simple point on which Russell was very keen to insist, and which seems right. It invites the question whether there are further universals, beyond properties and relations. |
| 5406 | Confused views of reality result from thinking that only nouns and adjectives represent universals [Russell] |
| Full Idea: The monism of Spinoza and Bradley, and the monadism of Leibniz, result, in my opinion, from an undue attention to one sort of universals, namely the sort represented by adjectives and substantives rather than by verbs and prepositions. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 9) | |
| A reaction: The 'linguistic turn' of 20th century philosophy, which should be treated with caution, but I agree that if we are going to accept universals, we need a wide vision of what categories they might fall into. I would prefer an ontology without 'relations'. |
| 4479 | All universals are like the relation "is north of", in having no physical location at all [Russell, by Loux] |
| Full Idea: Russell denies that universals have any location at all. ..He is generalising from the case of "is north of", which does not exist any more in Edinburgh than in London. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 9) by Michael J. Loux - Metaphysics: contemporary introduction p.55 | |
| A reaction: Russell may claim that the relation "is north of" is natural, but I suspect that it is a convention, mapped onto a physical situation. Reifying relations invite charges of a regress (as Bradley noted). |
| 8495 | The distinction between particulars and universals is a mistake made because of language [Ramsey] |
| Full Idea: The whole theory of particulars and universals is due to mistaking for a fundamental characteristic of reality what is merely a characteristic of language. | |
| From: Frank P. Ramsey (Universals [1925], p.13) | |
| A reaction: [Fraser MacBride has pursued this idea] It is rather difficult to deny the existence of particulars, in the sense of actual objects, so this appears to make Ramsey a straightforward nominalist, of some sort or other. |
| 8493 | We could make universals collections of particulars, or particulars collections of their qualities [Ramsey] |
| Full Idea: The two obvious methods of abolishing the distinction between particulars and universals are by holding either that universals are collections of particulars, or that particulars are collections of their qualities. | |
| From: Frank P. Ramsey (Universals [1925], p.8) | |
| A reaction: Ramsey proposes an error theory, arising out of language. Quine seems to offer another attempt, making objects and predication unanalysable and basic. Abstract reference seems to make the strongest claim to separate out the universals. |
| 1612 | Realism, conceptualism and nominalism in medieval universals reappear in maths as logicism, intuitionism and formalism [Quine] |
| Full Idea: The three medieval views on universals (realism, conceptualism and nominalism) reappear in the philosophy of maths as logicism, intuitionism and formalism. | |
| From: Willard Quine (On What There Is [1948], p.14) |
| 8506 | Particulars and properties are distinguishable, but too close to speak of a relation [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: I favour the Realist view that while we can distinguish the particularity of a particular from its properties, but the two 'factors' are too intimately together to speak of a relation between them. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (Against 'Ostrich Nominalism' [1980], §3) | |
| A reaction: Is Armstrong being a bit of an ostrich here? We could talk of part-whole relationships, or internal relations, or set membership, or coinciding objects, or bundles. We certainly ought to have a go. Armstrong approaches Quine here! |
| 4448 | Should we decide which universals exist a priori (through words), or a posteriori (through science)? [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: Should we decide what universals exist a priori (probably on semantic grounds, identifying them with the meanings of general words), or a posteriori (looking to our best general theories about nature to give revisable conjectures about universals)? | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (Universals [1995], p.505) | |
| A reaction: Nice question for a realist. Although the problem is first perceived in the use of language, if we think universals are a real feature of nature, we should pursue them scientifically, say I. |
| 17678 | Universals are just the repeatable features of a world [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: Universals can be brought into the spatio-temporal world, becoming simply the repeatable features of that world. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 06.2) | |
| A reaction: I wish Armstrong wouldn't use the word 'universal', which has so much historical baggage. The world obviously has repeatable features, but does that mean that our ontology must include things called 'features'? Hm. |
| 13573 | Universals are all types of natural kind [Ellis] |
| Full Idea: The various kinds of universals are all natural kinds of one sort or another. | |
| From: Brian Ellis (Scientific Essentialism [2001], 1.01) | |
| A reaction: This doesn't sound right. What about the universals of mathematics, or universals which are a matter of social or linguistic convention? I think Ellis is trying to hijack the word 'universal' in response to Armstrong's more idealistic account. |
| 13572 | There are 'substantive' (objects of some kind), 'dynamic' (events of some kind) and 'property' universals [Ellis] |
| Full Idea: Three categories of universals: 'substantive' universals have instances that are members of natural kinds of objects or substances; 'dynamic' universals are kinds of events or processes; 'property' universals are tropes of real properties or relations. | |
| From: Brian Ellis (Scientific Essentialism [2001], 1.01) | |
| A reaction: I would want to distinguish real properties from relations. It is important to remember that an object can traditionally instantiate a universal, and that they aren't just properties. |
| 10532 | We can understand universals by studying predication [Dummett] |
| Full Idea: It is by the study of the character of predication that we shall come to understand the essential nature of universals. | |
| From: Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) | |
| A reaction: I haven't founded a clearer manifesto for linguistic philosophy than that! Personally I find it highly dubious, given the shifting nature of linguistic forms, and the enormous variation between remote languages. |
| 10488 | It is lunacy to think we only see ink-marks, and not word-types [Boolos] |
| Full Idea: It's a kind of lunacy to think that sound scientific philosophy demands that we think that we see ink-tracks but not words, i.e. word-types. | |
| From: George Boolos (Must We Believe in Set Theory? [1997], p.128) | |
| A reaction: This seems to link him with Armstrong's mockery of 'ostrich nominalism'. There seems to be some ambiguity with the word 'see' in this disagreement. When we look at very ancient scratches on stones, why don't we always 'see' if it is words? |
| 15453 | The main rivals to universals are resemblance or natural-class nominalism, or sparse trope theory [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: The leading rivals to a theory of universals are resemblance or natural-class nominalism, or sparse trope theory. | |
| From: David Lewis (Comment on Armstrong and Forrest [1986], p.110) | |
| A reaction: If that is the complete menu, I choose resemblance nominalism. All discussion of properties in terms of classes is wildly misguided (because properties come first). Why not 'natural' tropes? |
| 15745 | Universals recur, are multiply located, wholly present, make things overlap, and are held in common [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: One and the same universal recurs; it is multiply located; it is wholly present in both instances, a shared common part whereby the two instances overlap. Being alike by sharing a universal is 'having something in common' in an absolutely literal sense. | |
| From: David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], 1.5) | |
| A reaction: A helpful spelling out of the commitment involved (in Armstrong and others) in belief in universals. To me this is a convenient list of reasons why the whole proposal is nonsense. Why does Lewis take them seriously? |
| 15746 | If particles were just made of universals, similar particles would be the same particle [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: We cannot say that a particle is composed entirely of its several universals, because then another particle exactly like it would have the very same universals, and yet the two particles would not be the same. | |
| From: David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], 1.5) | |
| A reaction: This is an argument either (implausibly) for haecceities or characterless substrata, or else for tropes (which are all separate, unlike universals). Particles as bundles of universals is not a theory I take seriously. |
| 8569 | I suspend judgements about universals, but their work must be done [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: I suspend judgement about universals themselves; I only insist that, one way or another, their work must be done. | |
| From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Intro') | |
| A reaction: This seems surprising (but admirable) in a great metaphysician, but I suppose it is symptomatic of the Humean approach to metaphysics. In the light of Ideas 3989 and 3990, I would have expected Lewis to deny universals. He probably did. |
| 8502 | Realism doesn't explain 'a is F' any further by saying it is 'a has F-ness' [Devitt] |
| Full Idea: Realists feel that the one-place predication 'a is F' leaves something unexplained, yet all that is offered is a two-place predication (a relational statement). There is an equal problem about 'a having F-ness'. | |
| From: Michael Devitt ('Ostrich Nominalism' or 'Mirage Realism'? [1980], p.97) | |
| A reaction: I think this is a key argument on the nominalist side - the denial that the theory of universals actually makes any progress at all in giving an explanation of what is going on around here. Platonist have the problem of 'partaking'. |
| 10472 | 'Structural universals' methane and butane are made of the same universals, carbon and hydrogen [Oliver] |
| Full Idea: The 'structural universals' methane and butane are each made up of the same universals, carbon and hydrogen. | |
| From: Alex Oliver (The Metaphysics of Properties [1996], §07) | |
| A reaction: He cites Lewis 1986, who is criticising Armstrong. If you insist on having universals, they might (in this case) best be described as 'patterns', which would be useful for structuralism in mathematics. They reduce to relations. |
| 4477 | Universals come in hierarchies of generality [Loux] |
| Full Idea: Universals come in hierarchies of generality. | |
| From: Michael J. Loux (Metaphysics: contemporary introduction [1998], p.24) | |
| A reaction: If it is possible to state facts about universals, this obviously encourages a rather Platonic approach to them, as existent things with properties. But maybe the hierarchies are conventional, not natural. |
| 4481 | Austere nominalists insist that the realist's universals lack the requisite independent identifiability [Loux] |
| Full Idea: Austere nominalists insist that the realist's universals lack the requisite independent identifiability. | |
| From: Michael J. Loux (Metaphysics: contemporary introduction [1998], p.60) | |
| A reaction: Plato's view seems to be that we don't identify universals independently. We ascend The Line, or think about the shadows in The Cave, and infer the universals from an array of particulars (by dialectic). |
| 8288 | Sortal terms for universals involve a substance, whereas adjectival terms do not [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: I want to distinguish 'substantial' universals from 'non-substantial' universals. The former are denoted by sortal terms, such as 'statue' and 'tiger', whereas the latter are denoted by adjectival terms, such as 'red' and 'spherical'. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 9.3) | |
| A reaction: It is an interesting question whether or not (assuming you are committed to universals) a universal necessarily implies an associated substance. If a property is a power, it must be a power of something. Nominalists will deny his distinction. |
| 4197 | The category of universals can be sub-divided into properties and relations [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: One might want to divide the category of 'universals' into two sub-categories of properties and relations. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.15) | |
| A reaction: This means a Platonic form like 'horse' ends up as a cluster of properties and relations. Is a substance not also a universal? |
| 10402 | Various attempts are made to evade universals being wholly present in different places [Swoyer] |
| Full Idea: The worry that a single thing could be wholly present in widely separated locations has led to trope theory, to the claim that properties are not located in their instances, or to the view that this treats universals as if they were individuals. | |
| From: Chris Swoyer (Properties [2000], 2.2) | |
| A reaction: I find it dispiriting to come to philosophy in the late twentieth century and have to inherit such a ridiculous view as that there are things that are 'wholly present' in many places. |
| 10318 | Realists take universals to be the referrents of both adjectives and of nouns [Hale] |
| Full Idea: On the traditional realist's view abstract qualities (universals) are the common referents of two quite different sorts of expression - of ordinary adjectives (predicates), and of abstract nouns referring to them. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.2.II) | |
| A reaction: This fact alone should make us suspicious, especially as there isn't an isomorphism between the nouns and the adjectives, and the match-up will vary between languages. |
| 10511 | It is doubtful if one entity, a universal, can be picked out by both predicates and abstract nouns [Hale] |
| Full Idea: The traditional conception of universals, resting as it does upon the idea that some single type of entity is picked out by expressions of such radically different logical types as predicates and abstract nouns, is of doubtful coherence. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.3 Intro) | |
| A reaction: A striking case of linguistic metaphysics in action. I don't believe in universals, but I don't find this persuasive, as our capacity to express the same proposition by means of extremely varied syntax is obvious. Is 'horse' an abstract noun? |
| 10521 | If F can't have location, there is no problem of things having F in different locations [Hale] |
| Full Idea: If Fs are incapable of spatial location, it is impossible for a and b to be at the same time in different places and yet be the same F. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.3.III) | |
| A reaction: A passing remark from Hale which strikes me as incredibly significant. The very idea of a 'one-over-many' is that there are many locations for the thing, so to conclude that the thing is therefore non-located seems to negate the original problem. |
| 4453 | One realism is one-over-many, which may be the model/copy view, which has the Third Man problem [Moreland] |
| Full Idea: One version of realism says that the universal does not enter into the being of its instances, and thus is a One-Over-Many. One version of this is the model/copy view, but this is not widely held, because of difficulties such as the Third Man Argument. | |
| From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: This presumably arises if the model is held to have the properties of the copy (self-predication), and looks like a bad theory |
| 4451 | If properties are universals, what distinguishes two things which have identical properties? [Moreland] |
| Full Idea: If properties are universals, what account can be given of the individuation of two entities that have all their pure properties in common? | |
| From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: Is this a big problem? Maybe only a space-time location can do it. Or, in the nice case where the universe is just two identical spheres, it may be impossible. |
| 4464 | Realists see properties as universals, which are single abstract entities which are multiply exemplifiable [Moreland] |
| Full Idea: Traditional realism is the view that a property is a universal construed as a multiply exemplifiable abstract entity that is a numerically identical constituent in each of its instances. | |
| From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.4) | |
| A reaction: Put like that, it seems hard to commit oneself fully to realism. How can two red buses contain one abstract object spread out between them. Common sense says there are two 'rednesses' which resemble one another, which is a version of nominalism. |