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13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure

[are known implications of knowledge also known?]

17 ideas
Sphaerus he was not assenting to the presence of pomegranates, but that it was 'reasonable' [Sphaerus, by Diog. Laertius]
Closure says if you know P, and also know P implies Q, then you must know Q [Dretske]
We needn't regret the implications of our regrets; regretting drinking too much implies the past is real [Dretske]
Knowing by visual perception is not the same as knowing by implication [Dretske]
Reasons for believing P may not transmit to its implication, Q [Dretske]
The only way to preserve our homely truths is to abandon closure [Dretske]
P may imply Q, but evidence for P doesn't imply evidence for Q, so closure fails [Dretske]
We know past events by memory, but we don't know the past is real (an implication) by memory [Dretske]
You have knowledge if you can rule out all the relevant alternatives to what you believe [Dretske, by DeRose]
Logical entailments are not always reasons for beliefs, because they may be irrelevant [Pollock]
How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne]
We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne]
Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne]
We don't have the capacity to know all the logical consequences of our beliefs [Conee/Feldman]
We can have evidence for seeing a zebra, but no evidence for what is entailed by that [Pritchard,D]
Favouring: an entailment will give better support for the first belief than reason to deny the second [Pritchard,D]
Maybe knowledge just needs relevant discriminations among contrasting cases [Pritchard,D]