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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive

[names imply information about the object]

31 ideas
Proper name in modal contexts refer obliquely, to their usual sense [Gibbard on Frege]
A Fregean proper name has a sense determining an object, instead of a concept [Sainsbury on Frege]
People may have different senses for 'Aristotle', like 'pupil of Plato' or 'teacher of Alexander' [Frege]
Any object can have many different names, each with a distinct sense [Frege]
Names need a means of reidentifying their referents [Read on Bradley]
Russell admitted that even names could also be used as descriptions [Bach on Russell]
Asking 'Did Homer exist?' is employing an abbreviated description [Russell]
Names are really descriptions, except for a few words like 'this' and 'that' [Russell]
Names don't have a sense, but are disguised definite descriptions [Sawyer on Russell]
Russell says names are not denotations, but definite descriptions in disguise [Kripke on Russell]
Russell says a name contributes a complex of properties, rather than an object [Russell]
Are names descriptions, if the description is unknown, false, not special, or contains names? [McCullogh on Russell]
Treat description using quantifiers, and treat proper names as descriptions [McCullogh on Russell]
Proper names are really descriptions, and can be replaced by a description in a person's mind [Russell]
A name is not determined by a description, but by a cluster or family [Kripke on Wittgenstein]
Failure of substitutivity shows that a personal name is not purely referential [Quine]
Ancient names like 'Obadiah' depend on tradition, not on where the name originated [Dummett]
We may fix the reference of 'Cicero' by a description, but thereafter the name is rigid [Kripke]
A bundle of qualities is a collection of abstractions, so it can't be a particular [Kripke]
A name can still refer even if it satisfies none of its well-known descriptions [Kripke]
We don't normally think of names as having senses (e.g. we don't give definitions of them) [Searle]
How can a proper name be correlated with its object if it hasn't got a sense? [Searle]
'Aristotle' means more than just 'an object that was christened "Aristotle"' [Searle]
Reference for proper names presupposes a set of uniquely referring descriptions [Searle]
Proper names are logically connected with their characteristics, in a loose way [Searle]
The traditional theory of names says some of the descriptions must be correct [Schwartz,SP]
We refer to Thales successfully by name, even if all descriptions of him are false [Schwartz,SP]
Proper names can be non-referential - even predicate as well as attributive uses [Bach]
Cicero/Cicero and Cicero/Tully may differ in relationship, despite being semantically the same [Fine,K]
Part of the sense of a proper name is a criterion of the thing's identity [Hawley]
Maybe proper names have the content of fixing a thing's category [Bealer]