12601 | The way things look is a relational matter, not an intrinsic matter [Harman] |
7387 | "Qualia" can be replaced by complex dispositional brain states [Dennett] |
7658 | Obviously there can't be a functional anaylsis of qualia if they are defined by intrinsic properties [Dennett] |
2582 | A brain looks no more likely than anything else to cause qualia [Block] |
7521 | It is question-begging to assume that qualia are totally simple, hence irreducible [Churchlands] |
7523 | The qualia Hard Problem is easy, in comparison with the co-ordination of mental states [Churchlands] |
3226 | Are qualia irrelevant to explaining the mind? [Rey] |
6546 | Pain is composed of urges, desires, impulses etc, at different levels of abstraction [Lycan] |
6547 | The right 'level' for qualia is uncertain, though top (behaviourism) and bottom (particles) are false [Lycan] |
4090 | Weak intentionalism says qualia are extra properties; strong intentionalism says they are intentional [Crane] |
7706 | If qualia supervene on intentional states, then intentional states are explanatorily fundamental [Jacquette] |
7011 | Qualia are not extra appendages, but intrinsic ingredients of material states and processes [Heil] |
4935 | The sensation of red is a point in neural space created by dimensions of neuronal activity [Edelman/Tononi] |