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15. Nature of Minds / B. Properties of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia

[theories that might explain qualia]

13 ideas
The way things look is a relational matter, not an intrinsic matter [Harman]
"Qualia" can be replaced by complex dispositional brain states [Dennett]
Obviously there can't be a functional anaylsis of qualia if they are defined by intrinsic properties [Dennett]
A brain looks no more likely than anything else to cause qualia [Block]
It is question-begging to assume that qualia are totally simple, hence irreducible [Churchlands]
The qualia Hard Problem is easy, in comparison with the co-ordination of mental states [Churchlands]
Are qualia irrelevant to explaining the mind? [Rey]
Pain is composed of urges, desires, impulses etc, at different levels of abstraction [Lycan]
The right 'level' for qualia is uncertain, though top (behaviourism) and bottom (particles) are false [Lycan]
Weak intentionalism says qualia are extra properties; strong intentionalism says they are intentional [Crane]
If qualia supervene on intentional states, then intentional states are explanatorily fundamental [Jacquette]
Qualia are not extra appendages, but intrinsic ingredients of material states and processes [Heil]
The sensation of red is a point in neural space created by dimensions of neuronal activity [Edelman/Tononi]