| 4380 | Not all actions aim at some good; akratic actions, for example, do not [Burnyeat on Aristotle] |
| 20041 | Intentional actions are those which are explained by giving the reason for so acting [Anscombe] |
| 20072 | We explain an intention by giving an account of acting with an intention [Davidson, by Stout,R] |
| 20076 | An intending is a judgement that the action is desirable [Davidson] |
| 20033 | Intentions are normative, requiring commitment and further plans [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20034 | Intentions must be mutually consistent, affirm appropriate means, and fit the agent's beliefs [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20169 | An action may be intended under one description, but not under another [Kekes] |
| 23146 | Motives produce intentions, which lead to actions [Driver] |
| 20039 | The causal theory says that actions are intentional when intention (or belief-desire) causes the act [Stout,R] |
| 20044 | The rationalistic approach says actions are intentional when subject to justification [Stout,R] |
| 20047 | Deciding what to do usually involves consulting the world, not our own minds [Stout,R] |
| 20065 | Should we study intentions in their own right, or only as part of intentional action? [Stout,R] |
| 20067 | You can have incompatible desires, but your intentions really ought to be consistent [Stout,R] |
| 20078 | The normativity of intentions would be obvious if they were internal promises [Stout,R] |
| 20022 | To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20023 | If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20025 | We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed [Wilson/Schpall] |