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20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions

[intrinsic nature of a decisive mental state]

16 ideas
Not all actions aim at some good; akratic actions, for example, do not [Burnyeat on Aristotle]
Intentional actions are those which are explained by giving the reason for so acting [Anscombe]
We explain an intention by giving an account of acting with an intention [Davidson, by Stout,R]
An intending is a judgement that the action is desirable [Davidson]
Intentions are normative, requiring commitment and further plans [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall]
Intentions must be mutually consistent, affirm appropriate means, and fit the agent's beliefs [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall]
An action may be intended under one description, but not under another [Kekes]
The causal theory says that actions are intentional when intention (or belief-desire) causes the act [Stout,R]
The rationalistic approach says actions are intentional when subject to justification [Stout,R]
Deciding what to do usually involves consulting the world, not our own minds [Stout,R]
Should we study intentions in their own right, or only as part of intentional action? [Stout,R]
You can have incompatible desires, but your intentions really ought to be consistent [Stout,R]
The normativity of intentions would be obvious if they were internal promises [Stout,R]
If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing [Wilson/Schpall]
To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned [Wilson/Schpall]
We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed [Wilson/Schpall]