| 5211 | An action is voluntary if the limb movements originate in the agent [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: In cases where the movement of the limbs that are the instruments of action has its origin in the agent himself, it is in his power either to act or not, and therefore such actions are voluntary. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1110a15) | |
| A reaction: He asserts this to show that an action is voluntary even under extreme compulsion or pressure. This seems right, and moves the focus to the concept of an 'excuse', which covers forgivable voluntary actions. |
| 5221 | Deliberation ends when the starting-point of an action is traced back to the dominant part of the self [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: In every case a man stops inquiring how to act when he has traced the starting-point of action back to himself, i.e. to the dominant part of himself; for it is this that makes the choice. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1113a06) | |
| A reaction: A footnote says the 'dominant part' of the soul is reason. If we dispense with 'free will' (and we should), this is the core of moral responsibility. Responsible actions are those caused by the dominant part of the mind. |
| 20051 | Reid said that agent causation is a unique type of causation [Reid, by Stout,R] |
| Full Idea: Thomas Reid said that an agent's causing something involves a fundamentally different kind of causation from inanimate causing. | |
| From: report of Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 1: Active power [1788]) by Rowland Stout - Action 4 'Agent' | |
| A reaction: I'm afraid the great philosopher of common sense got it wrong on this one. Introducing a new type of causation into our account of nature is crazy. |
| 20054 | There has to be a brain event which is not caused by another event, but by the agent [Chisholm] |
| Full Idea: There must be some event A, presumably some cerebral event, which is not caused by any other event, but by the agent. | |
| From: Roderick Chisholm (Freedom and Action [1966], p.20), quoted by Rowland Stout - Action 4 'Agent' | |
| A reaction: I'm afraid this thought strikes me as quaintly ridiculous. What kind of metaphysics can allow causation outside the natural nexus, yet occuring within the physical brain? This is a relic of religious dualism. Let it go. |
| 20015 | Freedom of action needs the agent to identify with their reason for acting [Frankfurt, by Wilson/Schpall] |
| Full Idea: Frankfurt says that basic issues concerning freedom of action presuppose and give weight to a concept of 'acting on a desire with which the agent identifies'. | |
| From: report of Harry G. Frankfurt (Freedom of the Will and concept of a person [1971]) by Wilson,G/Schpall,S - Action 1 | |
| A reaction: [the cite Frankfurt 1988 and 1999] I'm not sure how that works when performing a grim duty, but it sounds quite plausible. |
| 5488 | Regularity theories of causation cannot give an account of human agency [Ellis] |
| Full Idea: A Humean theory of causation (as observed regularities) makes it very difficult for anyone even to suggest a plausible theory of human agency. | |
| From: Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.7) | |
| A reaction: I'm not quite sure what a 'theory' of human agency would look like. Hume himself said we only get to understand our mental powers from repeated experience (Idea 2220). How do we learn about the essence of our own will? |
| 20052 | If you don't mention an agent, you aren't talking about action [Stout,R] |
| Full Idea: Once you lose the agent from an account of action it stops being an account of action at all. | |
| From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 4 'Agent') | |
| A reaction: [he refers to Richard Taylor 1966] This could be correct without implying that agents offer a unique mode of causation. The concept of 'agent' is reducible. |
| 20050 | Most philosophers see causation as by an event or state in the agent, rather than the whole agent [Stout,R] |
| Full Idea: Most philosophers are uneasy with understanding the causal aspect of actions in terms of an 'agent' making something happen. They prefer to think of some event in the agent, or state of the agent, making something happen. | |
| From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 4 'The causal') | |
| A reaction: There is a bit of a regress if you ask what caused the event or state of affairs. It is tempting to stop the buck at the whole agent, or else carry the reduction on down to neurons, physics and the outside world. |