| 123 | Do most people like equality because they are second-rate? [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Callicles: It's because most people are second-rate that they are happy for things to be distributed equally. | |
| From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 483c) |
| 1402 | Friendship is impossible between master and slave, even if they are made equal [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Even if you proclaim that a master and a slave shall have equal status, friendship between them is inherently impossible. | |
| From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 757a) |
| 262 | Men and women should qualify equally for honours on merit [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Men and women who have shown conspicuous merit should qualify for all honours without distinction of sex. | |
| From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 802a) |
| 2830 | We can claim an equal right to aristocratic virtue, as well as to wealth or freedom [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Virtue is the definitive principle of aristocracy, as wealth is of oligarchy, and freedom of democracy. …each of these is grounds for claiming equality. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1294a11) | |
| A reaction: By 'aristocratic' Aristotle means living at a high level of virtue (unlike oligarchs, who are just rich). Hence we can all aspire to be aristocrats. |
| 2833 | Equality is obviously there to help people who do not get priority in the constitution [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: In an oligarchy or a democracy it pays to give equality, or even preference, to those who participate in the constitution less, to the rich in a democracy, to the poor in an oligarchy. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1309a27) | |
| A reaction: A very nice idea. Every constitution will give priority to some group, even if it is all of the adults. So it should therefore have clauses supporting the others (e.g. children). |
| 2834 | It is always the weak who want justice and equality, not the strong [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is always the weaker who go in search of justice and equality; the strong reck nothing of them. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1318b05) | |
| A reaction: I take this to be merely an observation of the facts. He certainly doesn't want to deny them justice and equality, merely because that motivates them. |
| 19945 | Jew and Greeks, bond and free, male and female, are all one in Christ [Paul] |
| Full Idea: There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female; for ye are all one in Christ Jesus. | |
| From: St Paul (09: Galatians [c.55], 3.28) | |
| A reaction: No wonder women and slaves were enthusiastic about Christianity. This verse is powerful and influential, even if it was largely ignored by Christian rulers. Consider the relative positions of women in Islam and Christendom. |
| 20485 | Hobbes says people are roughly equal; Locke says there is no right to impose inequality [Hobbes, by Wolff,J] |
| Full Idea: Hobbes's principle of equality was a claim about the mental and physical capabilities of all people. For Locke it is a moral claim about rights: no person has a natural right to subordinate any other. | |
| From: report of Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan [1651]) by Jonathan Wolff - An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) 1 'Locke' | |
| A reaction: There are obvious questions to ask about the claim that people are naturally equal. For the second one, does the lion have a natural right to subordinate the gazelle? Who cares! I'm inclined to be consequentialist about equality. |
| 2366 | There is not enough difference between people for one to claim more benefit than another [Hobbes] |
| Full Idea: The difference between man and man is not so considerable as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit to which another may not pretend as well as he. | |
| From: Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan [1651], 1.13) |
| 19981 | No one even thinks of equality in monarchies and despotism; they all want superiority [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: In monarchies and despotic states, no one aspires to equality. Not even the idea occurs; everyone aspires to superiority. People of the very lowest rank only wish to rise in order to become masters of others. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 05.04) |
| 19991 | Equality is not command by everyone or no one, but command and obedience among equals [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: The spirit of true equality consists, not in creating a situation in which everyone commands, or in which no one is commanded, but rather in obeying or commanding only our equals. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 08.03) | |
| A reaction: I love this idea, but it is so easy to feel superior when you command, or to feel inferior when you are commanded. I take the solution to be the appointment of everyone in authority by those they will command (but fat chance of that). |
| 19786 | Three stages of the state produce inequalities of wealth, power, and enslavement [Rousseau] |
| Full Idea: Stage one gives law and property (producing inequalities of rich and poor), stage two gives a magistracy (producing weak and strong), and stage three is legitimate power becoming arbitrary (producing master and slave). | |
| From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part II) | |
| A reaction: This is the final answer to the prize essay question (with Idea 19772). What a beautiful analysis - and he didn't even win the prize this time! |
| 19800 | The social compact imposes conventional equality of rights on people who may start unequally [Rousseau] |
| Full Idea: Instead of destroying natural equality, the fundamental compact substitutes a moral and legitimate equality to any natural physical inequality. ...so that men all become equal by convention and by right. | |
| From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (The Social Contract (tr Cress) [1762], I.9) | |
| A reaction: This does not pretend that equality is a natural right. The imposition of equality is virtually the main point of forming a state. Effectively, the state operates like an insurance company, treating all contributors as equal. |
| 22672 | It is admirable to elevate the humble to the level of the great, but the opposite is depraved [Tocqueville] |
| Full Idea: One manly and lawful passion for equality elevates the humble to the rank of the great. But there exists also a depraved taste for equality, which impels the weak to attempt to lower the powerful to their own level. | |
| From: Alexis de Tocqueville (Democracy in America (abr Renshaw) [1840], 1.02) | |
| A reaction: There is a distinction in modern political rhetoric between 'levelling down' and 'levelling up'. Since levelling down is just destructive, and levelling up is unaffordable, it seems obvious that true equality needs to be a compromise. |
| 20486 | Only liberty, equality and sympathy can stand up to anti-social people [Kropotkin] |
| Full Idea: Liberty, equality and practical human sympathy are the only effective barriers we can oppose to the anti-social instincts of certain among us. | |
| From: Peter (Pyotr) Kropotkin (Law and Authority [1886], 1 'Anarchism'), quoted by Jonathan Wolff - An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) | |
| A reaction: One might state it more succinctly as 'only the social can oppose the anti-social'. The dominance in society of essentially anti-social people seems to have become a major political fact in 2017, in the UK and the USA. |
| 24116 | Justice says people are not equal, and should become increasingly unequal [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: People are not equal: thus speaks justice. …Humans should keep becoming ever more unequal. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1881-82 [1882], 12[43]) | |
| A reaction: Important to add a little dash of Nietzsche to the widespread modern mantras about equality. We must at least question the extent to which equality should be our aim. (Personally I am an egalitarian liberal). |
| 23161 | Slaves can be just as equal as free people [Russell] |
| Full Idea: There is equality where all are slaves, as well as where all are free. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 4) | |
| A reaction: A nice observation, though a person is only a slave if someone controls them, so it is not strictly true. |
| 23753 | People absurdly claim an equal share of things which are essentially privileged [Weil] |
| Full Idea: To the dimmed understanding of our age there seems nothing odd in claiming an equal share of privilege for everybody - an equal share in things whose essence is privilege. | |
| From: Simone Weil (Human Personality [1943], p.84) | |
| A reaction: Not sure what she has in mind. Probably not the finest food and drink. I suppose she is attacking the modern egalitarian view of democratic society. What things have privilege as their 'essence'? Being a 'winner'? Interesting, though. |
| 23901 | Relationships depend on equality, so unequal treatment kills them [Weil] |
| Full Idea: I conceive human relations solely on the plane of equality; therefore, so soon as someone begins to treat me as an inferior, human relations between us become impossible in my eyes. | |
| From: Simone Weil (Letters [1940], 1936-03) | |
| A reaction: Love that. This is precisely where equality starts. I fear that the problem is that people who don't treat others as equals don't want relationships with them, which particularly occurs in a competitive or hierarchical culture. |
| 23841 | By making money the sole human measure, inequality has become universal [Weil] |
| Full Idea: By making money the sole, or almost the sole, motive of all actions, the sole, or almost the sole, measure of all things, the poison of inequality has been introduced everywhere. | |
| From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], I 'Equality') | |
| A reaction: Presumably this dates right back to the invention of money, and then increases with the endless rise of capitalism. |
| 3233 | Equality implies that people are alike in potential as well as in needs [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: Supporters of equality have asserted that people are alike in certain things they could do or achieve, as well as in the things that they need and could suffer. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (The Idea of Equality [1962], §2) |
| 3234 | Equality seems to require that each person be acknowledged as having a significant point of view [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: Equality seems to require that each person is owed an effort at identification; they should not be seen as a surface to which a label can be applied, but one should try to see the world (including the label) from their point of view. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (The Idea of Equality [1962], §2) |
| 3275 | Equality was once opposed to aristocracy, but now it opposes public utility and individual rights [Nagel] |
| Full Idea: Egalitarianism was once opposed to aristocratic values, but now it is opposed by adherents of two non-aristocratic values: utility (increase benefit, even if unequally) and individual rights (which redistribution violates). | |
| From: Thomas Nagel (Equality [1977], §2) |
| 3277 | In judging disputes, should we use one standard, or those of each individual? [Nagel] |
| Full Idea: In assessing equality of claims, it must be decided whether to use a single, objective standard, or whether interests should be ranked by the person's own estimation. Also should they balance momentary or long-term needs? | |
| From: Thomas Nagel (Equality [1977], §6) |
| 3281 | The ideal of acceptability to each individual underlies the appeal to equality [Nagel] |
| Full Idea: The ideal of acceptability to each individual underlies the appeal to equality. | |
| From: Thomas Nagel (Equality [1977], §8) |
| 20277 | Equality of interests is a minimal principle, not implying equal treatment [Singer] |
| Full Idea: Equal consideration of interests is a minimal principle of equality in the sense that it does not dictate equal treatment. | |
| From: Peter Singer (Practical Ethics [1979], 02) | |
| A reaction: Do those convicted of serious crime retain equal interests? Should a huge group of people sacrifice all of their interests, because of the powerful interests of one person? |
| 23257 | We can treat people as equals, or actually treat them equally [Dworkin, by Grayling] |
| Full Idea: Dworkin distinguishes between treating people as equals, that is, 'with equal concern and respect', and treating them equally. This latter can be unjust. | |
| From: report of Ronald Dworkin (Taking Rights Seriously [1977]) by A.C. Grayling - The Good State 2 | |
| A reaction: The big difference I see between them is that the first is mere words, and the second is actions. Cf. 'thoughts and prayers' after US school shootings. How about equal entitlements, all things being equal? |
| 18621 | Treating people as equals is the one basic value of all plausible political theories [Dworkin, by Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Dworkin suggests that every plausible political theory has the same ultimate value, which is equality - in the more abstract and fundamental sense of treating people 'as equals'. | |
| From: report of Ronald Dworkin (Taking Rights Seriously [1977], 179-83) by Will Kymlicka - Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) | |
| A reaction: I associate this idea with Kant (who says they are equal by virtue of their rationality), so that's a pretty influential idea. I would associate the main challenge to this with Nietzsche. |
| 23106 | To rectify the undeserved equality, we should give men longer and women shorter lives [Kekes] |
| Full Idea: Redistribution ought to aim to equalise the life expectancy of men and women, by making men have longer and women shorter lives. | |
| From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 05.4) | |
| A reaction: This is a nice satirical counterexample to the Rawlsian claim that 'undeserved inequalities should somehow be compensated for' [Rawls 1971: 100]. See also Kurt Vonnegut's story 'Harrison Bergeron'. |
| 23121 | It is just a fact that some people are morally better than others [Kekes] |
| Full Idea: It is an obviolus fact that some people are morally better than others and that some are morally worse. | |
| From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 10.4) | |
| A reaction: This could be conceded, without then asserting that the moral ones are superior, or more deserving. That is a social strategy, rather than a fact. We can challenge the criteria for 'morally better', but we can't deny a rankng once it is agreed. |
| 23256 | Liberty and equality cannot be reconciled [Grayling] |
| Full Idea: Liberty and equality appear to be irresolvable contradictions. | |
| From: A.C. Grayling (The Good State [2020], 2) | |
| A reaction: [He particularly cites Isaiah Berlin for this view] Hm. The liberty of one is the liberty of all. I don't think I would feel that my liberty was unreasonably infringed if I lived in a society of imposed equality. The greedy hate equality the most. |
| 20526 | Utilitarians argue for equal distribution because of diminishing utility of repetition [Wolff,J] |
| Full Idea: The utilitarian argument for equality assumes that people have 'diminishing marginal returns' for goods. If there are two people and two nice chocolate biscuits, then utilitarianism is likely to recommend one each. | |
| From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 5 'Arguments') | |
| A reaction: The point is that the second biscuit provides slightly diminished pleasure. This is why you can buy boxes of assorted biscuits, which you are then not required to share. |
| 20528 | Difference Principle: all inequalities should be in favour of the disadvantaged [Wolff,J] |
| Full Idea: Difference Principle: Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged. | |
| From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 5 'Choosing') | |
| A reaction: Rivals would say that inequalities should go to those who have earned them. |
| 20997 | The need for equality among people arises from impartiality and objectivity [Sen] |
| Full Idea: The demand for seeing people as equals (in some important perspective) relates to the normative demand for impartiality, and the related claims of objectivity. | |
| From: Amartya Sen (The Idea of Justice [2009], 14 'Equality') | |
| A reaction: Either impartiality already contains (analytically) the concept of equality, or the principle of sufficient reason must be invoked. True impartiality removes any reason for preferring one person to another. But what if preference is 'to my taste'? |
| 20996 | All modern theories of justice demand equality of something [Sen] |
| Full Idea: Every normative theory of social justice that has received support and advocacy in recent times seems to demand equality of something. | |
| From: Amartya Sen (The Idea of Justice [2009], 14 Intro) | |
| A reaction: He mentions liberties, income, rights and utilities. |
| 20550 | Opportunity should ignore extraneous factors, or foster competence, or ignore all disadvantages [Swift] |
| Full Idea: The minimal conception of equality of opportunity is that race or gender or religion should not affect chances of a good job or education. The conventional conception needs equality in acquiring competences. Radical views ignore inborn disadvantages. | |
| From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 3 'Equality') | |
| A reaction: [my summary of Swift] The strong version only says the less talented should have access to large rewards. The whole idea has strong capitalist assumptions. |
| 20587 | Most people want equality because they want a flourishing life [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| Full Idea: If we want equality so much, we find that it is often because they think of equality as a prerequisite for a certain kind of flourishing life. | |
| From: Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 1 'Happiness') | |
| A reaction: Most writers seem to agree that we don't want equality for its own sake. In what respects do we want to be equal? Why not equal in hair colour? Hence it looks as if equality drops out. I would aim to derive it from the social virtue of respect. |
| 22840 | Mere equality, as in two trees being the same height, has no value at all [Charvet] |
| Full Idea: That the relation of equality might be considered a value in itself is an absurdity. Would the equality of blinding the only sighted person in a blind society be good? Is it inherently good that two trees are the same height? This is nonsense. | |
| From: John Charvet (Liberalism: the basics [2019], 08) | |
| A reaction: He cites Temkin 1993 as defending the blinding example! Obviously equality is only possible in certain respects (though electrons might be equal in all respects). So the point is to identify the important respects. The rest is rhetoric. |