4151 | Grammar tells what kind of object anything is - and theology is a kind of grammar [Wittgenstein] |
Full Idea: Grammar tells what kind of object anything is. (Theology as grammar) | |
From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952], §373) | |
A reaction: A classic twentieth century blunder, originating in Frege and culminating in Quine, of thinking that the analysis of language is the last word in ontology. |
1468 | If meaning is use, then religious sentences have meaning because they are used to assert an intention about how to live [Braithwaite, by PG] |
Full Idea: If the meaning of statements is their use (as Wittgenstein claims), then religious people use religious claims to assert an intention to follow a religious life and morality, and this intention gives their sentences meaning. | |
From: report of R.B. Braithwaite (Empiricist View of Religion [1955]) by PG - Db (ideas) |
1466 | Claims about God don't seem to claim or deny anything tangible, so evidence is irrelevant [Flew, by PG] |
Full Idea: An assertion is logically equivalent to denying its opposite, but claims about a 'gardener', or God, make neither claims nor denials of anything, so no evidence can count against the claim, or for it. | |
From: report of Antony Flew (Theology and Falsification [1950]) by PG - Db (ideas) |
20697 | One does not need a full understanding of God in order to speak of God [Davies,B] |
Full Idea: In order to speak meaningfully about God, it is not necessary that one should understand exactly the import of one's statements about him. | |
From: Brian Davies (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion [1982], 2 'Sayng') | |
A reaction: Perfectly reasonable. To insist that all discussion of a thing requires exact understanding of the thing is ridiculous. Equally, though, to discuss God while denying all understanding of God is just as ridiculous. |