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11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs

[mental state aiming at truth (Gk. doxa)]

27 ideas
We can believe a thing without knowing we believe it [Descartes]
Belief is stronger, clearer and steadier than imagination [Hume]
Opinion is subjectively and objectively insufficient; belief is subjective but not objective; knowledge is both [Kant]
Belief matters more than knowledge, and only begins when knowledge ceases [Nietzsche]
The goodness of opinions depends on their grounds, and corresponding degrees of conviction [Ross]
Beliefs can be ascribed to machines [Quine]
Beliefs are really enabling mechanisms for survival [Wilson,EO]
We can't contemplate our beliefs until we have expressed them [O'Connor]
Without language our beliefs are particular and present [O'Connor]
Having a belief involves the possibility of being mistaken [Davidson]
Belief is the power of metarepresentation [Dretske]
We must assess the truth of beliefs in identifying them [Newton-Smith]
A content is a property, and believing it is self-ascribing that property [Lewis, by Recanati]
The timid student has knowledge without belief, lacking confidence in their correct answer [Lewis]
Involuntary beliefs can still be evaluated [Feldman/Conee]
Belief truth-conditions are normal circumstances where the belief is supposed to occur [Papineau]
We could never pin down how many beliefs we have [Williams,M]
The function of beliefs is to produce beliefs-that-p when p [Millikan]
Belief is the most important propositional attitude [Lyons]
Maybe beliefs don't need to be conscious, if you are not conscious of the beliefs guiding your actions [Crane]
Maybe there are two kinds of belief - 'de re' beliefs and 'de dicto' beliefs [Crane]
We attribute beliefs to people in order to explain their behaviour [Chalmers]
A notebook counts as memory, if is available to consciousness and guides our actions [Clark/Chalmers]
We can have knowledge without belief, if others credit us with knowledge [Kusch]
The Humean theory of motivation is that beliefs may be motivators as well as desires [Engel]
There are reasons 'for which' a belief is held, reasons 'why' it is believed, and reasons 'to' believe it [Neta]
The basing relation of a reason to a belief should both support and explain the belief [Neta]